Evolutionary Game Theory And Entrepreneurs To Form A Mechanism

This dissertation studied the decision-making equilibrium of the individual willing to be an entrepreneur and innovation investment of an entrepreneur in applying evolutionarily game theory. The dissertation is organized as follows:In chapter one,we give a brief description of the basic theories relating to the thesis,including evolutionarily game theory,theory of entrepreneur and enterprise,human capital theory and innovation theory.In chapter two,we give an evolutionary stable equilibrium model of the individuals choose to be an entrepreneur in applying equilibrium analysis method of evolutionarily game theory. Firstly,we define human capital of entrepreneur-type considered to be indispensable to an individual who would to be an entrepreneur. Secondly,according to whether have latent entrepreneurial ability and latent creative ability or not,we separated the individuals into four types. And accordingly,the entrepreneurs are divided into creative entrepreneurs and common management entrepreneurs,and the labors are divided into creative labors and common labors. Under the hypothesis of each type individual might choose every type of human capital investment and relevant occupation,we analyze the evolutionary stable model of the individuals' human capital investment from society lay. We analyze ten evolutionary stable states,which of the states is realized depends on the society system where the individual decide whether to invest human capital to realize his latent ability by cost-income analysis. Under a society in which innovations are inspirited and talents showing themselves,the latent entrepreneurs will be practical entrepreneurs through human capital investment.In chapter three,applying replicator dynamics equation of evolutionarily game theory,we study an evolutionarily game model of the individuals' human capital investment decision-making from the point of those who would to be an entrepreneur. Separating the individuals into two types or four types,according to whether have latent entrepreneurial ability or have latent entrepreneurial and latent creative ability,we discuss evolutionarily stable strategies of the individuals' human capital investment game. The equilibriums include separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium,according to whether the individual can be aware of his latent ability ornot. Each type will invest his human capital of his latent ability under a certain best probability in equilibrium.In chapter four,we analyze evolutionary equilibrium of entrepreneur's innovation decision in applying evolutionary game theory. Because the entrepreneurs lie in a competitive environment,and the high risk and the high income coexist in innovations,as a result,an entrepreneur's decision-making not only depends on his particularity,but also depends on the strategy of his competitors. Regard the latent competitors as a colony,an entrepreneur selects a strategy can be treated a probability from the point of the colony of the entrepreneurs. Thereupon we analyze the evolutionary stable strategy of the entrepreneurs' innovation game. We construct manifold evolutionary game models:from a stage decision of innovation-investment to multistage decision of innovation-investment,from a single innovation selection to multiple objective choices between innovation and conservative manage,from without regard to financing case to innovation choice under the restriction of capital structure. Furthermore,in view of the fund corporations' asset allocation decisions direct the investment approach of the entrepreneurs,we study the evolutionary game between the fund managers and the latent investors.In chapter five,we study a series of game question of our country's enterprise reforming,including the game between government and enterprises,the game between government and entrepreneurs,the game between entrepreneurs. Applying the methods of evolutionary game theory,we analyze the evolutionary stable equilibrium of state-enterprise reforming game,and incentive game of innovation between the gove...