A Research On The Prevention Of Senior Managers' Self-Interested Behavior In Liansheng Stock

The original intention of equity incentive is to coordinate the interests of managers and owners to alleviate the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of two rights in modern enterprises.Equity incentive is a "double-edged sword",while the compensation of managers is tied to the interests of the company.At present,a lot of the implementation of equity incentive enterprises their own efforts to earn the pay,but through various control means,in the equity incentive the legal "appearance" under the cover of something for nothing.Therefore,it is very necessary to study the behavior of high management self-interest.Based on the couplet of joint-stock company executives get extra earnings carries on the preliminary quantitative analysis,found in the exercise of lian sheng co.,LTD,executives cumulative gain excess profits of 88.75 million yuan and 42.8 million yuan.Then,combining with the relevant institutional environment and market environment in China,this paper makes a comparative analysis of the above two self-interested means,and puts forward some policy Suggestions on this basis.Through practical examination as well as theoretical analysis,the author want to prove that managers can delete the high price and maximize them through high transfer and high cash dividends.Compared with domestic researches,this paper breaks through the analysis of the sample population mean,and further analyzes the excess earnings of individual stocks.