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Repair And Maintenance Capacity Allocation In Critical Equipment After-Sales Service Market:A Biform Game Analysis

Posted on:2016-09-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J J JiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330542957520Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Critical equipment has high value-added and high technological complexity and is directly related to critical missions of companies.In order to reduce the equipment interrupt bringing huge losses,the enterprises need build configuration maintenance capacity to deal with interruption and meet the demand from the failed equipment.At the same time,the key equipment maintenance capacity investment configuration is not easy to change once the amount has been determined.In real operation process,however,the critical equipment interrupt frequency is low,equipment failure frequency(or the need for maintenance ability)is influenced by equipment operating environment,operating personnel work habits and any other external factors,leading to that enterprise,in the process of actual operation,need to update the demand function of the equipment they are running,according to the operation signal existing in the operational process.A fixed amount of the initial maintenance capacity configuration and the fluctuant final repair ability demand exists objectively in real world.Lateral capacity allocation between similar enterprises is a commonly used method to solve the mismatching between capacity supplement and demand.Nowadays,however,the domestic and foreign research mostly focuses on the production capacity level of cooperation in the process of distribution,for the research in the field of service operation is few.The academic papers,regarding critical equipment maintenance service as the background,allocating capacity allocation among members in an union in order to realize a balance and risk-sharing are less.This paper is based on the mismatching phenomenon between capacity supplier and receiver in the key equipment maintenance services market,modeling the maintenance services progress as a two-process game that the configuration capacity and revenue allocation are solved in the cooperative progress,and how much repair capacity should be invested are modeled in the non-cooperative environment.Paying more attention to analysis some maintenance service structure existing in critical equipment after-sales market:(1)Studying the self-owned maintenance ability under the background of union maintenance ability competition game problem.Focused on the analysis of three kind of module existing in the critical equipment maintenance services market.Including multiple operators self-owned proprietary business independent decision-making configuration maintenance,under centralized decision-making system and operators self-owned proprietary business,allocating capacity in a union and under decentralized decision making system operators self-owned proprietary allocating maintenance ability.In order to analyze how maintenance services integrated distribution in alliance maintenance ability the first phase of their configuration,the influence of the amount of negotiation in the process of the decentralized decision making and how the confidence index affect each other's investment.(2)Studying the outsourcing maintenance ability under the background of union maintenance capacity in the league competition game problem.Introduce a third-party maintenance service provider,through the service ability in the form of options contracts,implement critical equipment maintenance services market capacity configuration and allocation.How their confidence index impact on maintenance service capacity investment decisionThrough summarizing the work of this article,we found that under the background of self-owned maintenance ability,when there exists a cooperative relationship among different operators in the after-sales market,there will be a risk-sharing phenomenon to diminish the unbalance between supply and demand.Negotiation confidence index on the investment decision of two operators creates a synthetic incentive.Under the background of outsourcing maintenance ability,due to the participation of third party service suppliers,compared to their own maintenance ability under three kinds of structure,two operators' investment and maintenance ability is reduced,and the two operators at the beginning of the first phase of the maintenance service capacity investment and operators in the second phase of the negotiation is closely relative to confidence index.
Keywords/Search Tags:Critical equipment, Repair and Maintenance, Capacity allocation, Biform game
PDF Full Text Request
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