Supply Chain Optimal Strategy Based On Push And Pull Contracts Under Uncertain Supply And Demand

With the intensification of market competition,dynamics and complexity,the supply chain faces more uncertainties,it increases the risk of inventory and out-ofstock,and affects the efficiency of the supply chain.Therefore,in order to better fit the reality,the model should consider supply and demand uncertainty.In terms of reducing supply risks,efforts to invest in improving supply reliability strategies have been the focus of research in recent years.The existing literature indicates that the inventory sharing model affects the performance of the supply chain,and in practice,the wholesale price contract is the most commonly used sharing mechanism and supply chain coordination contract.Therefore,under the push and pull wholesale price contracts,this paper improves the supply reliability by adding manufacturers' subsidies to improve the contract,and compares and analyzes the effect of the strategy on optimal decision-making and supply chain performance.It not only has realistic significance and theoretical basis,but also has Wide application prospects?First,this paper analyzes the supply and demand uncertainty,supply chain contract coordination and inventory risk sharing model under push and pull contracts.In the former study,it describes and characterizes random output,supply reliability,manufacturers' subsidies and supply improvement.Secondly,combining Stackelberg game,wholesale price contract and random output theory,under the push and pull wholesale price contracts,an unsubsidized model and manufacturers' subsidies to improve supply reliability models were established,it explores optimal subsidies,purchasing decisions,wholesale pricing decisions for manufacturers,and supplier's optimal production decisions,analyzes the effect of subsidies to improve supply reliability strategies on optimal decision-making.Finally,the correctness of the conclusions is verified by numerical simulation,and the comparison that Subsidies improve supply reliability strategies for optimal decision making and supply chain performance between the two contracts is analyzed.Research shows that under both contracts,the manufacturer's profits increase with the reliability of the initial supply,so manufacturers have incentives to provide subsidies to improve supply reliability;but the optimal size of subsidies decreases with the increase in risk-free interest rates.When the price exceeds a certain threshold,the manufacturer will not be willing to provide subsidies;after the supply is improved,the order quantity under the push contract,the production volume and the wholesale price under the pull contract increase with the increase in the risk-free rate,and both are less than without subsidies.Through comparison,under the Push contract,manufacturers order more products at a lower wholesale price,and are willing to provide a larger subsidy scale to obtain higher profits;the overall profit and profit margin of the supply chain under the push contract are both increased.Greater than the pull contract,so from the perspective of profit,the subsidy to improve the reliability of supply strategy is more effective under the push contract;the unit subsidy under the push contract causes the increase of the benefit of the supply chain to be less than the pull contract,so from the efficiency,the subsidy under the pull contract The efficiency is higher;but for manufacturers,the unit subsidy under the push contract brings more revenue than the pull contract,that is,the subsidy improves the supply reliability strategy is more favorable to the manufacturer under the push contract,and the pull contract is more favorable to the supplier?The main innovations of the article are:(1)Combining the Stackelberg game and the wholesale price contract theory,using the random output model,under the push and pull wholesale price contracts,improve the supply reliability strategy by adding manufacturers' subsidies,and improve the wholesale price contracts.A model of manufacturer's subsidies to improve supply reliability was constructed,and the effect of subsidy to improve supply reliability on optimal decision-making and supply chain was analyzed.This not only reduced supply risks,but also more effectively coordinated the supply chain.(2)Based on the theory of inventory risk sharing under different contracts,the impact of manufacturers' subsidies on improving supply reliability strategies was compared.It was pointed out that under both contracts,this strategy can coordinate supply chains and increase supply chain profits,but subsidies can improve supply reliability.The efficiency of strategies is different.