Inhibition Of Outer Conduct In The Middle Phase Of External Governance

With the development and improvement of the capital market in our country,the number of listed companies is increasing,the scale of listed companies continues to expand,and the degree of concentration of the company's equity continues to increase.Major shareholders use the internal and external governance mechanisms of listed companies to "Tunneling" large shareholders.The behavior of events is also endless.Although scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research and analysis on the behavior of "Tunneling" of major shareholders of listed companies,they discussed the factors and conditions affecting Tunnel,and carried out numerous system constructions and legal constructions based on the relevant theoretical basis.From San Jiu Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.,Monkey King Co.,Ltd.and Yue Jin Man Co.,Ltd.in the early 20th century,to Xian Cheng Mining,ST Insurance,and even LeTV.com in recent years,major shareholders did not have the slightest convergence and stoppage of listed companies' tunneling behavior.However,the frequency is more frequent,the amount is greater,and the means are more subtle.Therefore,the issue to be studied in this paper is the role of external governance in the process of short-selling of listed companies by major shareholders.With the concept of "hollowing out" being raised and the behavior of short-listed listed companies appearing repeatedly,domestic scholars have conducted a lot of empirical studies on how listed companies circumvented and curbed short-listed listed companies,and there have been a few scholars recently on the capital market in China.The case of hollowing out acts was analyzed by case studies,but few scholars stood at the perspective of external governance institutions to analyze the role of the external governance environment in the air,and analyzed and provided suggestions on the behaviors of individual agencies.In the research,the academic community often lacks sufficient attention to the external governance of listed companies.Even if it is involved,it will often not be explored in depth.However,there is insufficient attention to how the internal and external governance mechanisms continue to play their role and whether tunneling parties continue to conduct short-selling behaviors after the discovery of tunneling behavior.Based on the above,this paper uses literature research and case studies as the main research methods of this paper,analyzes the responsibilities and inexhaustible duties that external governance is found to be hollowed out,and discovers the deficiency of external governance mechanisms.This article selects Qinghai Xian Cheng Mining,which was forced to declare bankruptcy and reorganization because of the ultimate shareholders' short-selling,as the object of case analysis.According to the analysis of the responsibilities that all regulatory parties in external governance mechanisms should or can afford,the relevant supervisors will be supervised.Missing and its reason explain.Goal:After thorough analysis of the phenomenon that major shareholders continue to behave after the short-selling behavior has been revealed,this article proceeds from the perspective of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on the inadequacies of the supervisory body such as the CSRC,third party intermediaries,and the public media.Make up and improve.Research conclusions:In the situation that the internal governance mechanism of the short-selling party has completely failed,external governance can suppress,or at least be responsible for,the short-selling behavior of large shareholders.However,the current external governance parties have different powers and responsibilities.It is still unclear that the related institutional construction and practical experience is still very lacking.It requires the support and improvement of the external governance parties,especially the China Securities Regulatory Commission as the market supervisor.