Research On The Relationship Between Executive Equity Incentive And Audit Pricing Based On Earnings Management

The separation of the owner from the operator has caused a serious agency conflict.The equity incentive to the executives is a good way for the company to solve the agency conflict.It can promote the manager's more diligent work,make the behavior that is beneficial to the company as a whole and the long-term interests of the company,reduce the motivation of the earnings management,and promote the performance of the performance.The effect is improved.However,the executive stock incentive may lead to the self-interest of the executive.In order to achieve the right conditions,the executives increase the earnings manipulation,which is not conducive to the business performance of the enterprise.Under the current supervision background,it is an objective discussion on how the executive equity incentive system in our country affects the quality of the financial report of the enterprise and the influence on the earnings management,and how it affects the audit price,and the further reform and promotion of the executive stock incentive system in our country.The formulation of audit risk pricing decision has rich theoretical and practical significance.This paper uses 2012-2016 years and five years to carry out the research of listed companies which have implemented executive equity incentive.First,the system development of executive stock incentive,the implementation of China's equity incentive and the types of executive stock incentive are expounded and analyzed.Secondly,through the implementation stage of high management equity incentive and Executive Stock The two ways of power incentive intensity are used to empirically study their impact on earnings management and audit pricing.Through the system background combing and statistical analysis,it is found that the number of companies motivated by executive equity is increasing in our country,and most of the enterprises in our country have launched two incentive modes:stock option and restrictive stock.Through the empirical analysis,it is found that the executive equity incentive will increase the earnings management behavior,which will increase the audit pricing,and the executive equity incentive intensity has less impact on it,which may be the result of the low incentive intensity in our country.Through the third sides of the accounting firm,this paper discusses the influence of executive equity incentive on the enterprise,and examines the possible way of transferring the earnings management between the executive stock incentive and the audit pricing.By implementing the equity incentive system to the executives,the enterprise increases the middle of the earnings management behavior of the enterprise.Path to make the audit price rise.Based on the analysis of the system background and the results of empirical research,this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations from two perspectives of enterprises and accounting firms.On the one hand,enterprises should improve the implementation of equity incentive,and can introduce some operating profit and loss projects which are difficult to manipulate as the right conditions.It can appropriately extend the time and limit of the sale.It can adjust the types of incentive,improve the internal governance environment of the enterprise,and play the role of the supervision of the independent director.The positive role of executive equity incentive.On the other hand,firms should consider executives' equity incentive situations in order to reduce audit risks and risks faced by shareholders.