Study On Bounded Rational Game Behaviors Of Stakeholders In Network Car Market

As Internet technology matures,it has spawned a series of emerging industries.As an innovative shared economy model and 020 business model,on the one hand,Network car has optimized travel resource allocation,increased passenger experience value,and eased travel difficulties for urban residents to product consumption.The traveler's mode of travel has taken a new look;On the other hand,it has also had a huge impact on the traditional taxi business based on franchising,which has forced the industry to push forward with comprehensive reforms,at the same time presenting new challenges to government supervision.Due to the fact that Network car affects the rights and interests of stakeholders,the introduction of the New Deal will inevitably trigger the collision of its interests and autonomous game,which has caused widespread concern.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study the intricate game relationships between stakeholders in China's Network car industry in the context of the implementation of the New Deal.The traffic travel system is a complete and uncertain system.The irrational factors have a significant impact on the process and results of self-governance by the stakeholders in the Network.Looking at the existing research conclusions on Network car,most of them are based on the assumption of absolute rationality.Therefore,this paper analyzes in depth the interest appeals and behavioral characteristics of the Transportation Network Companies,drivers,and passengers under the complex problem scenario.Based on the perspective of bounded rationality,this paper divides the bounded rational behavioral elements of Network Car stakeholders into two aspects:individual cognitive biases and psychological biases.From the perspective of individual cognitive biases,ie,passenger loyalty,we build the Stackelberg game model of the Transportation Network Company,taxi driver and cruise taxi company,analyzing the profit and optimal pricing of the Transportation Network Company under this model,and the driver's optimality.The channel selection strategy aims to solve the problem of supply volume in the Network Car market,enhance the travel experience of passengers,and maintain the user volume of the bilateral car platform.The research shows that the optimal mileage price of Network Car increases with the increase of the cruise taxi mileage price,and decreases with the increase of the "rebate";The lower the passenger loyalty and the more sensitive to the price,the stronger the willingness of the driver to join the transportation network company.The more conducive to the development of the transportation network company.From the aspect of individual psychological biases,it is assumed that drivers and passengers are both risk-neutral and folly rational "economic man",while the Transportation Network Company has excessively self-confident limited-rational behaviors,with the transportation network company as the client and the driver as the agent.Trilateral Moral Hazard Agency Model is established to solve the nonlinear constraints of the Transportation Network Company,and the optimal contract design mechanism of the Transportation Network Company is proposed.We analyze the influence mechanism of dismissal tendencies,subsidy strength(profit sharing mechanism),driver's efforts,passenger default and other factors on the three sides of the moral hazard problem,trying to achieve a win-win situation.The research shows that:In order to effectively deal with possible moral hazards,the Transportation Network Company should reasonably control its self-confidence level,employ low-cost workforces,and have a high output of the unit's efforts to drive car drivers;Network car's drivers also should enhance their skills learning.