Research On Food Safety Supervision Of Network Takeout Based On Evolutionary Game

Hunger breeds discontentment,food to safety first,food safety is a guarantee of national stability and development.In recent years,with the maturity of mobile network coverage and mobile payment system,Internet and traditional catering industry have been further integrated,and online ordering service has begun to appear.Online ordering,with smart phones and other mobile terminals,provides consumers with fast,convenient and varied dining experience,so that consumers get the favor of young people,especially the younger generation.But it also brings a lot of problems such as the rapid development of the Internet takeaway,black workshop,unlicensed situation occurred frequently,because the number of business takeaway scattered,government regulation exists shortcomings;and ordering platform and business interests with takeaway ordering platform regulatory consistency,there are inherent deficiencies;in addition,ordering extend the platform to join the food supply chain,increase the information asymmetry between consumers and business consumers supervision takeaway,lack of ability.In a word,the safety supervision of takeaway food is not optimistic.This paper takes ordering platform and takeout business as the research object,aiming at the frequent takeaway safety problems,the evolution game analysis method is used to analyze the regulatory behavior of the ordering platform and the evolution of the takeaway's production behavior.First,we review the related literature of online ordering,consolidate the theoretical basis of the article,and summarize the current situation and problems of online catering Quality Supervision in China.On this basis,we build the evolutionary game model of platform and business,then study the evolutionary game of platform and business separately under the condition of government regulation and consumer participation.The results show that if there is no other stakeholders' constraints,the strategy of ordering platform and business will tend to be in a regulatory failure state(passive regulation,unsafe production).When the government penalties for illegal businesses and platforms,selection of evolution strategy platforms and businesses will tend to be two situations,namely effective supervision status(active supervision,safety production)and regulatory failure state(negative regulation,safety production),increasing the likelihood of platform service income and income decrease,merchants sell takeaway platform positive regulation cost and business safety production cost and increase the penalties for the government,platforms and businesses increased ability to identify illegal business platform can improve the evolutionary stable strategy trend of effective supervision status.When consumers can identify illegal businesses and give a low rating,(negative regulation,safety production),(negative regulation,safety production),(active supervision,safety production)and periodic shocks are likely to be the final state evolution strategy and business platform,but effective supervision status does not appear,indicating that consumers participate in the supervision of foreign sell security governance improvement is limited,cannot make the platform and businesses and legitimate business.Finally,according to the conclusion of the article,we put forward some suggestions on the safety supervision of the food products in our country,and provide reference for the supervision institutions and the booking platform.It has a certain theoretical and practical significance to solve the problem of the security of the takeout.