Study On Incentive Strategy For Depositing Housing Provident Fund Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

China's Housing Provident Fund(HPF)system was born in the 1990 s under the economic structural reform.After more than 20 years of rapid development,the Housing Provident Fund system has played an important role in promoting the reform of housing system,ensuring the basic housing of the residents,improving the living conditions of the residents,and improving the consumption level of housing.However,with the introduction of a series of new Housing Provident Fund policies,the problems of inadequate growth,limited coverage and uneven source structure have become increasingly prominent,which has seriously restricted the development of Housing Provident Fund in China,which seriously threatens the housing security and liquidity of Housing Provident Fund.Based on the comparative analysis,it is believed that we need to further strengthen the incentive work for depositing Housing Provident Fund,with the focus on the business units including state-owned enterprises.This study constructs the game model between the Housing Provident Fund management organization and the Enterprise through the evolutionary game method,analyzes the formation mechanism and the evolution trend of the conflict between the Housing Provident Fund management organization and the Enterprise deposit,studies the evolution law and the conditions of the evolution stability strategy in theory,and analyzes the evolution process of the interaction between the respective strategy selection behavior,with a view to the conclusion.In order to ensure the correctness and reliability of the argument,a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is built on the basis of traditional static reward and punishment mechanism to discuss the evolutionary stabilization strategy and its evolution process on the basis of the traditional static reward and punishment mechanism,and try to simulate the propositions through the MATLAB software.This study finds that: First,when the static reward and punishment mechanism is adopted,the inspection cost is the key factor for the Housing Provident Fund management organization to decide to check.When the Housing Provident Fund management organization examines the net utility of the potential harvest of the cost,the Housing Provident Fund management organization will be selected and checked;the output utility is the key to the firm's decision.Factors,when an enterprise loses the output utility that is paid less than paid or fails to pay,and the amount of money that it has withheld,it will always take the initiative to carry out the deposit.Second,when the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is adopted,the evolution trajectory of the Housing Provident Fund management organization and the enterprise revolves around the only evolutionary stability strategy.At this time,the improvement of the higher level work and the reduction of the inspection cost will increase the inspection probability of the management institutions under the stable state,and increase the probability of the enterprise to pay the actual deposit,and the two probability of the most changes in the inspection cost is the most.Sensitive。 Third,when the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is adopted,the less paid amount of the enterprise will also affect the choice of the two parties.The higher the amount of payment is,the greater the probability of the inspection of the management institutions.Fourth,when the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is adopted,and the increase of punishment can not only improve the probability of the enterprises in the stable state,but also reduce the probability of the inspection of the management institutions.Therefore,the heavy penalty will be the choice of the Housing Provident Fund management organization.