Research On The Principal-agent Lease Model Of "Company+Farmer" Under Bilateral Effort

This paper builds a two-tier supply chain consisting of risk-neutral companies and risk-averse farmers under the conditions that the company's sales efforts and farmers' production efforts jointly determine the output of the supply chain.It mainly investigates the decision-making behavior of companies and farmers based on the principal-agent leasing model,and studies the impact of the risk aversion,production capacity,and minimum land production of the farmer on the decision-making behavior of the company and the farmers.The aim is to propose a "company + farmer" cooperation model with more balanced interests and farmers' initiative,which will essentially guarantee the fulfillment rate in the production of agricultural products.Firstly,under the bilateral efforts of the company and farmers,this paper compares and analyzes the optimal decision-making behavior of the parties in the supply chain under the centralized decision model,the decentralized decision model,and the cost-sharing model.Also compares the utility levels under each decision model.The research of this paper show that due to the inconsistency of upstream and downstream interests of supply chain,the optimal effort input of the company and farmers under the decentralized decision-making is strictly less than the effort under the centralized decision-making model,which can not achieve supply chain coordination.In addition,the cost-sharing model has improved the unbalanced interests between the company and the farmers to a certain extent,but it still cannot fundamentally change the disadvantaged status of farmers and possible violations.According to the principle of principal-agent theory,this paper constructs the "company+ farmer" leasing model under the bilateral efforts aiming at the problem of unequal status and breach of contract in the cooperation between the company and the farmers.Then,under the conditions of asymmetric information,this paper analyzes the incentive coefficient,rent formulation strategy and the decision-making of all parties in the supply chain.Finally,the incentive coefficient and the rent are discussed by numerical simulation.The research results show that,when the company sets the incentive coefficient in the early stage,it only needs to consider the extent of risk aversion,production capacity,and exogenous uncertainty of the household.However,the determination of rents is more complex,it also needs to considerthe factors such as the company's sales capacity,the lowest land production and the basic price of the agricultural product market.In cooperation,if the farmer's production capacity is stronger and the risk aversion coefficient is lower,the company should consider giving a higher proportion of shares in the later period and pay less land rent in the previous period to make up for the loss caused by the division.Finally,this paper expands the number of farmers involved in cooperation,builds the principal-agent leasing model of "company +n farmers".It also discusses the optimal incentive coefficients and rents for n farmers under two strategies of decentralization and decentralization.The analysis finds that the two division modes have no influence on the determination of the optimal effort level and the incentive coefficient of each party,and under the n farmers,the incentive coefficient given by the company to a single farmer household is not affected by the conditions of other farmer households.In terms of rent,land rent in the decentralized mode is strictly higher than the land rent under the centralized model.In the two way of sharing,the total income of the company and the farmers is equal.Taking into account the randomness of the production process of the agricultural products,the company will prefer the centralized sharing model in cooperation,and the farmers will tend to split the distribution model.