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Research On Supply Chain Coordination Contract Mechanism For "Company+Farmer" Based On Farmland Leasing Model

Posted on:2019-01-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Y HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330566986486Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
From the perspective of supply chain coordination,adhering to the principle of "revenue sharing,cost sharing and risk sharing" and based on the classical newsboy model,this article introduces three kinds of land leasing models of fixed rent,quota rent and joint-stock rent,to build a bilateral income model of "company + farmer".This paper study the optimal production decision behavior of the company and the farmer in the case of decentralized decision making and centralized decision making.In addition,and analyzes whether the three kinds of wage contract mechanism of "fixed salary","fixed salary + production performance" and "incentive wage and compensation" can perfectly coordinate the whole supply chain.When analyzing the decision-making behaviors of farmer with risk aversion,CVaR is introduced in this paper.The result shows that the production decision-making behavior of the supply chain is independent of risk aversion when the fixed rent model is adopted in the case of decentralized decision making.Among them,when adopting fixed salary model,the optimal output of peasant households is zero.Under the remaining two salary payment,the optimal output of peasant households increases monotonically with the wage incentive coefficient or decreases monotonically with the compensation factor.The perfect coordination of supply chain can be realized by adjusting the incentive coefficient or compensating factor.This paper introduces a quota rent model with the "guarantee purchase and the market" mode,and the rent is determined by the order price,cost and output of agricultural products.The result shows that the optimal output of three types of wage payment is the monotone increasing function of order price and risk aversion.The optimal output under fixed salary under decentralized decision making model is less than the optimal output of centralized decisionmaking,while the other two wage payment mode can make the optimal yield under the two circumstances equal by adjusting the order price,the incentive coefficient or compensating factor.In the joint-stock rent,the company pays the farmer rent in proportion to their income.Under three kinds of wage payment,the optimal yield of agricultural products increases with the increase of proportion and risk aversion.Among them,the "fixed salary" model is only effective for farmer effective with low risk consciousness,while for farmers with high risk aversion consciousness,its optimal output will be zero,unable to realize supply chain coordination.By contrast,optimal production of "fixed salary + production performance " or "incentive wages-compensation" under decentralized decision making strictly increases with the increase of incentive coefficient.Therefor,the optimal output of the supply chain can be achieved by adjusting the proportion,incentive coefficient and compensation factor to make it equal to the optimal output of the centralized decision-making.This paper is to study on the simplified model.However,the influence of market demand for agricultural products price,factors such as information asymmetry between companies and farmer is also important reason to influence companies and farmers to make decisions.In the future research,the above factors will be considered to be included in the research scope,so that the decision-making model of "company + farmers" leasing cooperation model is more practical.
Keywords/Search Tags:company+farmer, farmland leasing mode, CVaR, salary contract coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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