Research On The Early Warning Of Collusion Of Major Shareholders And Executives

The hotspot and core of modern corporate governance are the agency issues concerning the controlling shareholder's encroachment on the interests of small and medium shareholders.Since the major shareholders do not directly participate in the daily operation and management of the company,the transfer of the interests of the company must be formed in alliance with the managers.As the development of China's market and related legal protection systems are still immature,the collusion between the major shareholders and managers and short-sighted violations of the interests of small and medium shareholders is very serious.In-depth study of this phenomenon and the search for an effective early-warning mechanism is of great significance for safeguarding the rights and interests of minority shareholders and stabilizing China's capital market.Based on principal-agent theory,insider control theory and other theoretical tools,this paper uses a combination of case analysis and empirical research to discuss the formation conditions of the collusion between major shareholders and managers in the target case and the basic characteristics of conspiracy.The eigenvalues,and the use of principal component analysis,model analysis of early warning indicators,in order to corroborate the accuracy of the forecast perspective of the target case company.Through the data mining of the case and relevant data investigations,it was found that ST Huaze major shareholders used the equity to control the board's decision-making behavior,and conspired with the company's senior management to manipulate the company's funds in violation of regulations,and used the hidden routes of related companies to transfer funds of listed companies and conceal important information.The asymmetry of information among small and medium shareholders and misleading investment have resulted in the loss of their interests.The research conclusions show that the early warning indicators of the collusion between the company's major shareholders and senior executives are specifically focused on: the company's equity is too concentrated;the company's management layer overlaps with the management positions and the status of concurrent affairs is serious;the long-term occupation of huge amounts of related parties;shareholders and management The internal interests of the company are linked;financial data disclosed to the public have abnormal fluctuations.According to the characteristic indicators reflected in the target case,this paper uses the principal component analysis method to establish a model,examines the samples extracted,and discusses the early warning mechanism that can be established for the early warning indicators and the system that should be established and improved at the corporate governance level,including improving executive incentives.Mechanism and board supervision mechanism.The innovation of this paper is to study the collusion of short-sinking behaviors of major shareholders and senior executives from the perspective of early warning,find the characteristic values ??of early warning through specific cases,and carry out simple empirical research to improve the feasibility of the selection of early-warning indicators and the feasibility of early-warning mechanisms.