Research On Collusion Between Large Shareholders And Senior Executives Based On Tunneling Motivation

At present,the ownership structure of the company tends to be centralized,and the proportion of majority shareholders is rising.As for the listed company,the major shareholders of the listed company may seize the interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders by depending on the position of control right,so as to achieve the purpose of seeking private interests.This leads to the second kind of principal-agent problem more prominent in modern corporate governance.In order to realize their tunneling motivation,major shareholders will form "interest alliance" with senior executives.The problem of large shareholders and executives conspiring to empty listed companies needs to be solved,because it not only damages the interests of investors,but also affects the orderly development of the capital market.Therefore,the study of the characteristics of the interest game between the major shareholders and the senior executives,and the specific measures of collusion can point out the direction for the prevention of such problems and the improvement of corporate governance.This paper selects Shanghai Xinmei Real Estate as a case study,focusing on the study of its major shareholder,after obtaining the control of the listed company,through related party transactions,major shareholders' reduction and arbitrage,industrial transformation,etc.,to plunder the interests of Shanghai Xinmei Real Estate and its small and medium shareholders.This case is extremely relevant and consistent with the collusion between major shareholders and senior executives,which is of representative and research significance.Based on the theoretical analysis,this paper studies the conditions of the collusion between the major shareholders and the senior executives of Shanghai Xinmei from the structure of the board of directors,the relationship between the major shareholders and the senior executives,and the structure of the board of supervisors.Then,the paper combs the specific means of collusion between the major shareholders and the senior management of Shanghai Xinmei Real Estate.Next,it studies the economic consequences of Shanghai Xinmei Real Estate after the major shareholders cooperate with the senior management,mainly from the three aspects of governance efficiency,economic performance and the interests of small and medium shareholders.Finally,in view of the specific problems of the above analysis,suggestions are put forward from the aspects of equity check and balance mechanism,internal corporate governance,laws and regulations,so as to strengthen the protection of small and medium-sized shareholders,maintain the healthy development of the capital market,and avoid the recurrence of such events from the perspective of sustainable development.