Test Of Credit Constraint Of Rural Land Management Right Mortgage Loan

Rural finance plays an important role in the development of China's rural economy.However,the existing rural financial system cannot meet the financial needs of rural areas.The scarcity of funds has limited the development of rural economy.Due to information asymmetry and lack of collateral,China's rural areas are facing severe credit constraints.The farmland management right mortgage loan uses the farmland management right as a collateral,solves the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in the credit market,eases the credit constraints,and improves the loan availability of farmers.Due to the provisions of the “Property Law” and other laws,mortgage loans for farmland management rights have been strictly prohibited by law.The Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee proposed to grant peasants possession,use,income,circulation,mortgage and security of contracted management rights,and allow farmers to use shares of contracted management to develop agricultural industrialization operations;the Central Document No.1 of 2014 further stated that Stabilize the right of rural households to contract,relocate the right to operate the land,and allow the mortgage financing of financial institutions with the right to operate the contracted land.For the first time,it is proposed to split the “two rights” to “the separation of three powers”;in March 2016,it was regulated by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission,the China Banking Regulatory Commission,and the Finance Bureau.The Ministry of Agriculture,the Ministry of Agriculture,and the People's Bank of China jointly issued the Interim Measures for the Pilot Project of Mortgage Loans for the Operation of Contracted Land in Rural Areas,which provided direction for mortgage loans for farmland management rights.The clear policy orientation of the central government has dispelled the concerns of financial institutions,and mortgage loans for land management rights have been pushed forward.Based on the study of domestic and international research on mortgage loans for farmland management rights,the paper first analyzes mortgage loans for farmland management rights,and studies them from three aspects: property rights theory,transaction cost theory,and demand and supply equilibrium theory..At the same time,it analyzes the existing mortgage loan model for operation rights of agricultural land in Yangling District and Nanzheng County.It has the characteristics of comprehensive mortgageable projects,complete property rights trading mechanism,and perfect compensation mechanism for agricultural land mortgage risks,but there are also no special property rights.The evaluation institutions and policies lacked relevant legal protection issues.From an empirical point of view,the field survey data of YangLing and NanZheng,which are experimental loans for the operation rights of Shaanxi rural farmland,and the Probit model from the perspective of the financial supplier,quantify the willingness of the loan officer to provide mortgage loans for operating rights to agricultural land and the influencing factors.The relationship concluded that the income of rural households,the degree of awareness of farmers' policies,the scale of agricultural land,loan experience,risk compensation system,legal perfection,and policy stability have a positive effect on the willingness of loan officers to provide mortgage loans for farmland management rights.The factors such as the age of the farmer and the level of education have a negative impact on the willingness to supply.Among the significant factors,the positive influencing factors are ranked according to the regression coefficient: legal perfection,risk compensation system,policy stability,loan experience,farmer income The degree of perfection of property rights appraisal,and the degree of awareness of farmers' policies;negative impact factors are ranked according to the magnitude of marginal impact: the degree of education,the age of farmers,and the difficulty of collateral disposal have no significant effect on the willingness of the loan officer.In addition,by comparing the stability of the regression model before and after the three policy system variables including risk compensation system,legal perfection,and policy stability,it is concluded that the policy and institutional variables have a greater impact on the decision-making of financial institutions.The mortgage loan for the management right of agricultural land also needs to be optimized in terms of legal protection,construction of property right assessment institution,and establishment of a sound multi-level risk compensation mechanism.Through empirical analysis and domestic experience,the paper argues that under the current mortgage loan model for rural land management rights,it needs to actively adapt to rural realities,farmers' needs,and agricultural characteristics,and continuously deepen rural financial reforms to meet the increasing financing needs of farmers.It is also necessary to adopt legislation to protect the stability and legal environment of mortgage loans for farmland management rights,accelerate the establishment of specialized farmland management rights valuation agencies,and establish multi-level loan risk compensation mechanisms.