A Game Study On The Exchanges Of Interests In Homesteads

With the acceleration of the urbanization process,the scarcity of urban land and the intensification of the utilization of urban land have been gradually improved.On the contrary,the inefficient use of rural land and the frequent circulation of the land are frequent.In order to adapt to the development of market economy,Safeguarding the national public interest,the reform of China's rural land system is imminent,in which the optimization of the homestead system is an important part of the reform.Therefore,it is of great significance to study and solve the difficulties encountered in the actual operation of the homestead in the pilot area of the homestead.It is of great significance to alleviate the contradiction between the tension of urban land and the waste of rural land in order to maintain social harmony and long-term stability.In this paper,through the analysis of the behavior of each stakeholder in the process of extinguishing the homestead and the quantification of the utility function of the behavior decision,the author analyzes the factors that influence the behavior decision of each stakeholder in the process of how the game is analyzed.The results show that only to enhance the level of landless protection of farmers,improve the social security system,revitalize and improve the rural land market,regulate the relevant legal system,in order to exit the homestead to carry out the smooth operation of escort.The main body of the article is divided into seven chapters,the main contents,are,summarized,as,follows:The first chapter shows the background,purpose and significance of the article,summarizes and reviews the relevant research on domestic homestead and foreign agricultural non-agricultural research,and points out the possible innovation of the article.In the second chapter,the author briefly introduces the theoretical basis of this paper,and explains the applicability of the game theory in the exit of the homestead in terms of the participation of the owner and the game type.In the third chapter,the game model exists in the process of homestead exit,and then the four sub-games involved in the game model are analyzed and explained,namely,the game between the peasant and the village collective organization,the village collective organization and the government Between the game,the village collective organization and the real estate business between the game,the government and the real estate business between the game;In the fourth chapter,the game results of the game model are analyzed in detail,and the game model is applied to the actual work.Through the concrete analysis of the utility function,the optimal solution of the balanced parties is obtained.The probability of the illegal operation is minimized during the base exit process.This result provides theoretical support for the proposed optimization proposal.In the fifth chapter,the author puts forward some suggestions for the analysis of the previous,which is to ensure the realization of the equilibrium condition of the game-to strengthen the supervision of the homestead exit process;to change the proportion of the main body of the game revenue-to establish a high standard of farmers Compensation mechanism to improve the risk costs of government and housing prices;break the background of the game binding-the establishment of a unified urban and rural social security system to speed up the modernization of rural areas;weaken the game environment constraints-a unified urban and rural land market,cultivate landless farmers employment services system.In Chapter 6,Conclusion and Prospect.And summarizes the contents of the first six chapters,and explains and envisages the research direction of the future homestead exit.