Research On Coordination Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Of Electronic Products Based On Game Theory

In recent years,as the consumption structure upgrades and the mobile payment technology gains momentum,the electronic products have been updated at an increasingly pace.In this connection,the world has witnessed a large number of electronic wastes at a rapid growth trend.As a result,such issues as environmental pollution and resources shortage have become increasingly prominent,and people are paying more and more attention to the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)featuring recycling and remanufacturing.enterprises can not only bring great economic benefits,but also promote their green image so as to achieve good eco-social benefits by recycling waste products and turning them into abundant available resources through a series of reverse logistics activities.However,the CLSC is composed of multiple stakeholders with independent property rights,their individual interests and goals may conflict with the overall interests and systematic goals of the supply chain,and the information asymmetry among the members of the chain also increases the risk of the CLSC and affects the operation efficiency of it,so it is very important to design a reasonable coordination mechanism to achieve the overall coordination of the CLSC.Based on the actual situation,this paper deeply discusses the coordination mechanism design of electronic products CLSC facing various complex situations in order to enhance the overall coordination of CLSC and realize the improvement of CLSC in light of Pareto Principal.The main contents of this paper are as follows:Firstly,the paper defines and summarizes the related concepts and basic theories,including the definition of CLSC and coordination of CLSC for electronic products,as well as the overview of game theory and principal-agent theory,which lays a sufficient theoretical foundation for the design of the follow-up coordination mechanism.Secondly,the paper delves into the pricing and coordination mechanism of the CLSC when the information maintains symmetry.Based on the game theory,the corresponding coordination models for the RR model of retailer recycling and TPR model of third-party recycler recycling are respectively established,and the pricing strategies and coordination mechanisms of each participant under different recycling models are given.The pricing strategies and results of the two models are analyzed and compared,providing ideas for the pricing decisions of each node enterprise and effectively eliminating the interest conflicts of the CLSC.Finally,a numerical example is used to verify the scientificity and rationality of the model.Thirdly,in view of the RR mode CLSC when information asymmetry occurs,considering the relationship between manufacturers and retailers in terms of principal sales and principal recovery,a multi-task incentive coordination model is established under the framework of game theory and principal-agent theory.On top of that,the optimal incentive contract is obtained,which can not only induce and motivate retailers to increase their efforts and maximize the total revenue of the CLSC,but also enable manufacturers and retailers to register more reasonable benefit and risk sharing,thus achieving the goal of CLSC coordination.On the basis of the original model,the government subsidy risk sharing factor is introduced to increase the retailer's revenue sharing ratio and effort,the total sales volume and recovery volume,and the total revenue of the CLSC.Finally,the feasibility and scientificity of the model are verified by numerical example analysis.At last,in view of the TPR mode of CLSC when information maintains asymmetry,considering remanufacturers need long-term incentives for recyclers,and under the framework of game theory and principal-agent theory,a dynamic incentive mechanism combining implicit incentives with explicit incentives is introduced.Meanwhile,how to make the dynamic incentive mechanism work effectively is analyzed,as well as the influence of correction coefficient,discount rate and bargaining capability on incentive contracts.The dynamic incentive model is compared with the incentive model without reputation effect,and it is concluded that the dynamic incentive mechanism can improve the incentive strength under certain conditions and achieve overall coordination and Pareto improvement of the CLSC.Finally,a numerical example is given to verify the feasibility of the model and the correctness of the conclusions.