Evaluating Impacts Of Innovation Subsidies On Innovation Performance Of High-tech Enterprises

Research on theories of government research and development(R&D)subsidies has been paid great attention to by both theorists and practitioners.Innovation,especially technological innovation,which brings scientific and technological progress,and be of the competitive advantage of one nation,is the major motivation of economic development.Innovation represented by productivity and its growth,and knowledge competition and intellectual competition being the major international competitions,make topics concerning the innovation activities and innovation performance of companies heat issues in theory and practice as well.However,due to the negative effect of exogenous technological spillovers,public goods attributes of technology,and market failure,economic entities other than companies that innovate gain extra earnings.As a result,companies that innovate experience a reduction of their earnings,causing the output of innovation is lower than the optimal level of social welfare.That is,innovation activities of companies must be subsidized.These unfavorable environment for and benefits of innovation provide rationales for government support of private and public sector R&D,and innovation subsidy has been playing an important role in stimulating research and development(R&D)as a response to high levels of risk and cost of innovation.Nevertheless,the definition and classification criteria of government innovation subsidy are confused and the subsidy methods are diversified.The definition of innovation performance and its evaluation index system are very different from one another,which disturbs the research of its impact on the performance of technological innovation,and the dynamic characteristics of the enterprise innovation activity and government subsidy activity are also neglected.Therefore,how to study the mechanism of government innovation input subsidy and innovation output subsidy on the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises,under dynamic and multi-period conditions has become a hot issue.Meanwhile,providing political guidance for government departments to design and apply two kinds of innovation subsidy in order to actively guide the innovation activities of high-tech enterprises and enhance their innovation intensity and performance,and offering directional guidance to high-tech enterprises to choose innovative activities are also of significant importance.Several research methods are used in this paper,namely mixed method research,evolutionary game theory,system modeling and simulation based on multi-agent,and case study,and our research focus is on the mechanism of how government innovation input and output subsidies influence the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises under dynamic and multi-period conditions.Based on the theoretical analysis of the impact of government innovation subsidies on the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises,and the status quo of government subsidies and innovation performance of high-tech enterprises in Jiangsu Province,this dissertation analyzes the mechanism of how two kinds of innovation subsidies work on innovation performance of high-tech enterprises in Jiangsu Province.Furthermore,an evolutionary game model and further simulation are carried out,and a number of explanatory case studies are carried out to test the conclusions of the study.Finally,several political suggestions are put forward.The innovation points in the dissertation are summarized in three parts as follows:(1)A new system to evaluate the innovation performance of firms is established.This dissertation fully considers the characteristics of technological innovation,the mechanism of two kinds of government innovation subsidies and the effect of network externality,on which basis established a evaluation function of innovation performance of high-tech enterprises.The evolution function consists of innovation profit,which represents by innovation output,absorption of technology spillover,expected government incentives,network externalities,and the conversion cost of innovation subsidy strategies.(2)A new classification of government innovation subsidies is proposed.The drawbacks of the current classification of government innovative subsidies lie in that,on the one hand,a certain enterprise may obtain multiple subsidies at the same time,such as obtaining ex ante subsidies while obtaining ex post subsidies,so that it is difficult to tell impacts of various subsides from one another on firms' innovation performance in empirical analysis and case model analysis.On the other hand,in practice,all provinces and municipalities in China have innovated on innovative subsidies,lacking systematic study.Basing on the summary of the experience and insufficiency of innovation subsidy of all provinces and cities in the past five years in China,this dissertation innovatively divides the government subsidies into innovation input subsidy and innovation output subsidy,so as to make up for the gap in existing research.(3)The dynamic evolution of effects of two kinds of government innovation subsidies on innovation performance of high-tech enterprises is analyzed.In the real world business activities,decision-makers tend to be bounded rationality.This dissertation uses evolutionary game theory and admits the bounded rationality premise of players to make mistakes in the face of miscellaneous things,which is more in line with the realistic situation of game participants in real world.The limited rationality that evolutionary game theory admits makes the participants of the game jump out of the rational rationality space of bounded rationality and face more complex and complicated choices.In addition,this dissertation introduces scale-free network complex network,EWA learning model,builds a high-tech enterprise / government evolutionary game model,and uses Matlab to simulate.The simulation is based on real data of high-tech enterprises,and multiple sets of parameters are used to find out sensitivities of different factors of government subsidy policies to the selection of firms' innovation activities and performances.Thus,on the one hand,it overcomes the limitation of the traditional rationality of game theory and makes individual players change from a homogenous rational participant to a heterogeneous limited rational participant.On the other hand,through the simulation analysis,the dynamic adjustment and operation of the model,we are able to quantitatively and dynamicly disclose the diffusion,conversion and competition of two types of government subsidies,making it possible to put forward specific and practical policy recommendations.