Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Chinese Judges Under The Post System

In the current round of judicial reform in China,one of its goals is to establish a regularized,qualified and professional judicial team.As one of the key components of the judicial team,the construction and stability of the team of judges is an important index to measure whether the judicial reform is successful or not.However,according to the empirical researches,the new round of judicial reform has not effectively alleviated the problem of losing judges.This paper uses incentive theory as a tool to analyze the specific incentive measures taken in the judicial reform,and finds the problems in the new judicial reform.Through the analysis of the problems,we further understand the causes of these problems,and put forward some feasible suggestions.The author believes that this is of great significance to the future improvement of the judicial reform.(1)By observing the practical effect of the judicial reform,the author finds that the reform of judges has not effectively alleviated the phenomenon of judges leaving.(2)Through the analysis of the reasons for the judge-leaving and the incentive mechanism of the judicial reform,the author finds that the incentive mechanism of the reform does not stimulate the demand of judges,but has some problems such as insufficient incentive,wrong incentive and misplaced incentive occurred.(3)The author further analyzes the reasons behind the incentive problems and finds that the limits of national and local financial resources on material incentives,the limits of reform convergence,and the internal salary structure of the court and the social acceptability.At the same time,the author also finds the differences between the judge group and the general public sector,the diversity of its occupational purposes,the irreplaceability of the occupation,the difficulty in measuring the work and the nonproductive nature of the work,which are all factors that cannot be ignored in the incentive design for judges.(4)In view of the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of the judicial reform,there is another important reason that the design of the incentive mechanism ignores the particularity of the judge group and also misses some factors existing in the incentive mechanism itself,such as risk,supervision,balanced incentive and so on.In short,after several years of practice,the author thinks the phenomenon of the judge-leaving is not effectively improved due to that the new judicial reform has not effectively solved the existing factors that affect judge-leaving and a high risk factor of lifetime liability was added,which are the main reasons for the problems in the current round of judicial reform.Therefore,the current judicial reform hasn't been a complete success,the reform still needs to continue.This article analyzing the incentive mechanism of judicial reform through incentive mechanism theory,has important reference value whether in practice or in theory.