The Ultimate Control Of Listed Company,Proportion Of Institutional Ownership And Earnings Management

The investment decision-making behavior of investors is inseparable from the earnings information obtained,and the quality of earnings information will directly influence the healthy and orderly development of the capital market.Ultimate control people tend to use the pyramid shareholding and cross shareholding stake and a series of complex mode control of the enterprise management activity,which makes the separation of control and cash flow rights increase,and its control of its own advantage,by earnings management for the regulation of listed company profit,whitewash grab behavior performance to cover up their own interests,which severely damage the quality of the earnings information and the legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders.Institutional investors as the main outside shareholders,can to enterprise's management behavior play a supervision and restraint function,and can effectively relieve internal control people unreasonable and manipulation,which to a certain extent,effectively restrain the ultimate interests damage behavior of the people.At present,in China's capital market institutions and mechanisms related to investor protection is becoming more complete,the ultimate control person infringes upon the interests of minority shareholders behavior also widely regulation,grab behavior in order to complete their own interests,the ultimate control person will plan,together with the managers of companies through illegal way harm the authenticity of accounting information to cover up their own occupation.For the interests of people of ultimate control infringement to implement more effective supervision and control,institutional investors can use its more professional comprehensive financial information comprehension and "vote with their feet" effectively restrict the ultimate control person to take the interests of small and medium shareholders violations.Based on the Shanghai and shenzhen two city in China a-share non-financial listed companies as the research object,screening the related data of 2014-2016 as the research sample,using cross-sectional modified Jones model to measure the degree ofearnings management of listed companies,and in accordance with the surplus management indicators could be divided into full sample sample group,the positive earnings management group and negative earnings management group study,respectively,on the basis of theoretical analysis to build the regression test in this paper,the research hypothesis and model,the empirical analysis of the ultimate control of listed companies,institutional ownership,respectively,for the impact of earnings management,ownership and institutions play A role of regulation,Finally,based on the research conclusion,the corresponding policy Suggestions are put forward.Studies have shown that the ultimate control of listed companies and corporate earnings management has significant positive correlation,and institutional ownership and enterprise surplus management(full sample group and positive earnings management group)were significantly negative correlation relationship and can effectively restrain the ultimate control of earnings management behavior,but the inhibitory effect was not significant in the negative earnings management group.Research from two aspects of ultimate control and institutional ownership is new impact on earnings management point of view,not only enriches the existing literature,but also can provide empirical evidence for the research on the influence factor of earnings management.