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Under The Ultimate Control Of Institutional Investors And Management Earnings Forecast

Posted on:2015-02-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D P ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330452993614Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In a market economy dominated by today’s society, the development of the listed company into a booming trend, and surplus forecast are playing an increasingly important role in the development of the company, and the related influencing factors of institutional investors, to some extent with the subtle influence of surplus forecast in the relationship with the healthy development of listed companies, objective, accurate, timely and reliable information is an important capital market of enterprise value evaluation foundation, is also the normal operation of capital market price mechanism and realize the basic premise of effective allocation of resources. However, information about the core of the enterprise value of earnings forecast, also is one of the most important content of information in capital market, it will help to guide ordinary investors to invest, and guide the social market really achieve the effect of optimal allocation of resources. As a financial intermediary to maintain the market institutional investors, in terms of scale, information and knowledge has incomparable advantages, it is on the market of ordinary investors based on of the most important sources of information.As one of the important contents of the information disclosure management earnings forecast information of management behavior in the securities market and investors decision‐making has an important influence. First, management by surplus forecast to the market to provide the information about the company’s expected surplus, which reduces the degree of information asymmetry between management and investors; Eventually reduce the cost of capital and litigation risk, establishing or alter investors’ expectations of the company and due to the transparent and accurate disclosure report and improve their reputation. Many studies have shown that both at home and abroad, management surplus predict behavior will affect the pricing decisions of investors and trading behavior and information environment in the market as a whole, thus great attention by regulators. Secondly, in the mature capital market, the management earnings forecast most of the voluntary disclosure; At home, China securities regulatory commission, exchange work in the center daily news, annual reports of listed companies to inform for several times and the related measures for the management of performance is a significant change of circumstances demand forecast, but there is no right Prediction methods, time to very specific rules, so as to provide management with respect to the manner of prediction from a select a certain space. But, for investors, accurate, timely and robust information useful in their decision making may be higher. In this way, the management of self‐interest may exist agency conflict between choice and investor demand."A dominant" and "dual structure" is the special equity structure of listed companies in China, considering the nature property may influence institutional investors participating in corporate governance, this study for the test. The results show that the state‐owned property right nature, hindered the institutional investors participating in corporate governance has a negative effect on institutional investors to improve company performance; Relative to the independent institutional investors and listed companies of state‐owned property rights of independent institutional investors governance effect has more significant effect; And in the share reform period, the negative influence has not weakened.China’s situation is special, because the existence of state‐owned holding companies,"a dominant" phenomenon is widespread, so the involvement of the institutional investors is difficult to play their role, the domestic scholars on the research on rare, is also one of the reasons, but in non‐state‐owned holding companies, equity is more dispersed, whether institutional investors can play a role, combined with national conditions to do in‐depth discussion on the aspects in this paper.
Keywords/Search Tags:surplus management forecast, Institutional investors, The state‐owned holding company, Non‐state owned
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