Financial-Industrial Integration And Efficiency Of Enterprise Investment

With the rapid development of insurance industry,the allocation of insurance capital presents diversified development trend and stock investment has become one of the important ways of asset allocation in the new era.Existing research shows that insurance capital's holding listed company shares has corporate governance effect and can reduce the degree of external information asymmetry in enterprises at the same time.In theory,insurance institutional investors have professional and huge capital advantages to supervise corporate governance and reduce the degree of external information asymmetry in enterprises so that the over-investment and under-investment problems can be improved.Thus,the relationship between insurance capital shareholding and the efficiency of enterprise investment requires empirical research.Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed company data,from 2012 to 2016,this paper tests the relationship between insurance capital shareholding and investment efficiency,mainly using descriptive statistics,comparison between groups,correlation analysis and multiple linear regression and other methods.Enterprise property rights is used as a moderator variable in the paper and the research shows that insurance capital shareholding has different impact on the efficiency of enterprise investment with different property rights.In addition,the paper explores the enterprise mechanism between insurance capital shareholding and the efficiency of enterprise investment from the perspective of agency problem and information asymmetry.The conclusion of this paper mainly has the following three points:First,insurance capital shareholding can improve the efficiency of enterprise investment on the whole.The impact on the improvement of enterprises' over-investment is very weak,but insurance capital shareholding can significantly improve the enterprises'under-investment problem;Second,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the state-owned enterprises can effectively improve their over-investment problem,while the impact on the under-investment of state-owned enterprises is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises.Third,the insurance companies can restrain the agency problem through the supervision effect to improve the efficiency of enterprises'over-investment problem and can reduce the degree of external information asymmetry in enterprises to improve their under-investment problem.Finally,this paper puts forward three relevant policy suggestions:to fully exert the supervision mechanism of insurance shareholders,to accelerate the resolution of financing constraints and to standardize insurance capital shareholding system.This research has practical significance on the relationship between insurance capital shareholding and the efficiency of enterprise investment in our country.