The Relationship Research Between Network Position Of Institutional Investors And Inefficiency Of Corporate Investment

Investment efficiency is the most important factor affecting the company's profitability and future growth,and it is also an effective external performance of corporate governance.In listed companies,corporate investment decisions are influenced by shareholders,directors,and management.Institutional investors,as shareholders of listed companies,can directly influence the investment decision-making behavior of enterprises and play a governance role.Most of the previous studies discussed the governance efficiency of institutional investors from the perspective of individual characteristics such as the proportion of institutional investors holding shares,and held that individual characteristics such as shareholding ratio determined the governance motivation and governance ability of institutional investors.However,the behavior of institutional investors is not completely independent.Institutional investors are likely to be affected by other institutional investors in the market when making decisions on whether to participate in corporate governance and how to participate in corporate governance.How do individual institutional investors interact with each other and how does this mutual influence promote institutional investor governance? This article attempts to answer this question from the perspective of social networks.The research of this paper mainly starts from the following six aspects: The first part is the introduction,which mainly introduces the source and background of the topic.The second part is literature review.This section first introduced the concept of important terms in this study,and then based on the previous literature,it reviewed the research on the influencing factors of non-efficiency investment in enterprises,the relationship between institutional investors and non-efficiency investment,and the institutional investor network.Position impact consequences and other related research results.This article analyzes the theory in the third part and elaborates on the logic of this research through a series of elaboration on corporate governance and social network theory.Then it puts forward the hypotheses that verify the relationship between institutional investor network position and corporate inefficient investment..Next,in order to verify the hypothesis,this article has carried on the research design in the fourth part,takes the A-share listed company as the sample in 2012-2015,uses the spss19.0 software to relate to the institutional investor network position and the enterprise noninvestment efficiency correlation.The relationship is empirically studied.For the construction of relevant models and the selection of variables,this part is also introduced in detail.In the fifth part,the paper presents the results of empirical tests in tabular form and elaborates the results.Finally,robust reliability test was used to demonstrate the reliability of the research conclusions.Based on the theoretical support and data support,this article briefly summarizes the conclusions of this study in the sixth section,and provides opinions on the practical guiding significance of the research institute,and evaluates the limitations of this study.Future research makes a forecast.Through empirical research,this paper has reached the following conclusions: First,the listed companies in China showed a trend of more insufficient investment than excessive investment from 2013 to 2016.Second,the effect of institutional investors on the governance of inefficient investments is indeed constrained by the position of the network.Specifically,the more institutional investors are in the center of the institutional investor network,the lower the level of overall non-efficiency investment(underinvestment/overinvest-ment)of the company.Third,there is a difference in the governance effects of institutional investors' network center position on underinvestment and overinvestment.After the classification of non-efficiency investment types,it is found that the inhibitory effect of institutional investor network center position on over-investment is more pronounced than the mitigation effect on underinvestment.Fourth,the effect of institutional investors on the governance of inefficient investments varies with the position of the network center.The centrality of the position and the betweenness of the position have more obvious effects on the overall non-efficiency investment of the company and over-investment.The role of governance on underinvestment is insignificant.The nearcentral position has a good governance role whether it is insufficient investment or excessive investment.