A Study On The Influence Of Management Shareholding On Stock Price Crash Risk In China's Listed Companies

The sharp rise and fall of the stock price is a special phenomenon in the capital market,especially the fall of the stock price,which has damaged the investor's confidence.The stable operation of the capital market depends on the steady change of the stock price to a great extent.Since twentieth Century,global stock prices have fallen frequently.As China's capital market,as an emerging market,there is a certain gap between maturity and stability compared with western developed countries.Stock price collapse often happens.After the global financial crisis in 2008,the impact of the stock price plunge on the capital market caused people to think.The reasons for the formation of the stock price collapse are divided into the market share price colla pse and the stock price collapse at the level of the stock market.This paper will study the stock price collapse at the stock level.Managerial ownership is considered to be the key to solve the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers of this tradition,the existing research is divided into two aspects,one that the managerial ownership is a good solution to the agency problem,to prevent the agent's moral risk,reduce the agency cost;others think that managerial ownership has become selfish product management rights under the management of the power,but against the interests of the shareholders,the effectiveness of management ownership has been the focus of academic and practical circles.In this paper,the effectiveness of managerial ownership is extended to the capital market,and the combination of managerial ownership and stock price collapse broadens the study of the risk cause of the stock price collapse.The managerial ownership is analyzed in accordance with the "synergy" or "trench effect",if in accordance with the "synergy",while managerial ownership,earnings management,improve the quality of information,suppress the stock crash,if in accordance with the "entrenchment effects",managerial ownership,and earnings management,reduce information quality,strengthen the the stock price collapse,this paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management,stock crash of the three.At the same time,the relationship between the management stock and the stock price collapse is analyzed.The conclusions of this paper are:(1)the risk of stock ownership collapse is negatively related to managerial ownership and the risk of share collapse.(2)to explore the causes of negative correlation between managerial ownership and stock crash,introduces the intermediate variables of earnings management,the empirical results show that managerial ownership is an effective incentive system,the manageme nt may be to reduce earnings management,improve the quality of information,reducin g the risk of private stock crash(3)enterprise management ownership and stock crash risk is negatively related to stability.Compared with state-owned enterprises,manageril ownership of private enterprises is more inspiring,which can inspire executives' ability,reduce earnings management,achieve benefit synergy and reduce the risk of stock price crash.This paper provides a theoretical basis for the management sharehol ding mechanism of listed companies with different property rights,and at the same time,empirically proves that the incentive mechanism of managerial ownership plays a positive role in reducing the risk of stock price collapse and protecting the interests of investors.