Research On The Path Of Transferring Benefits By The Large Shareholders Under Collusion

With the development of corporate governance theory,the focus of the research on the agency problem has shifted from the first type of agency problem to the second type of agency problem.This article,based on the review of domestic and foreign research on collusion and tunneling,combines the theory of short-term collusion between major shareholders and senior managers,and analyzes the case of Duolun.Firstly,case analysis method is used to analyze the intrinsic motivation and external conditions of collusion short-selling between large shareholders and senior executives.Then,the path of interest transfer of major shareholders under the situation of conspiracy emptiness is described,focusing on how the benefits are transferred from the company to the major shareholders and executives.This study finds that after the short-term motives are generated by the large shareholders,they conspire with senior executives by signing an invisible contract with senior executives to make the internal governance mechanism useless.This is the prerequisite for the formation of the benefit transfer path.This case not only analyzes the relatively common path of interest transfer,such as related guarantees,capital occupation,and manipulation of stock prices,but also analyzes a relatively special path,that is,the relatively rare transfer of funds through direct transfer of subsidiaries.In addition to the common features such as low economic cost and strong concealment,the most obvious is that senior executives are highly involved in collusion.In the transfer path terminal,the company's interests will be transferred to the major shareholders' own interest groups.Executives usually enjoy the benefits of on-the-job consumption and cross-service.This case is the behavior of a typical major shareholder who uses control to substantially replace the senior executive to help him conspire to make a short position.Even if the internal governance system is perfect,senior management does not necessarily strictly abide by the implementation.Therefore,based on each link of the benefit transfer path,this paper considers a method that can cut off or block out a short-distance path,and protects the same type of collusion short-circuiting before the formation of the benefit transfer path,control of interest transfer,and profit transfer.Post-punishment and prevention of these four perspectives make recommendations.