The Influence Of Member Fairness, Farsighted Behavior And Power Structure On The Strategy And Performance Of Dynamic Closed-loop Supply Chain Members

This paper encompasses the studies of myopic & farsighted behavior,fairness-preferred behavior,power structure of channel and the impact of demand expansion due to recycling practices upon the dynamic equilibrium strategies and recollection of used-products in CLSC.And by utilizing differential game theory and Bellman continuous dynamic programming theory,we acquire the dynamic equilibrium strategies of all supply chain members under different scenario and the evolution path of recycling rate,and proceed to conduct the sensitive analysis to the key endogenous parameter.Our research unveil that:1)farsighted behavior is dominant Nash equilibrium strategy for both game players in the dynamic CLSC and contribute to boosting the recollecting rate as well as the performance of both sides;2)although the relative fairness concern behavior of retailer help to enhance his own operational benefits,this preference is detrimental to manufacturer's performance and recollection of used-products;3)remanufacturing allow the dynamic closed-loop supply chain system to achieve the Triple Bottom Line(TBL)which are operational benefits(cost reduction),environmental benefits(reclaim and recycle)and social benefits(demand expansion)repectively.4)it will be of advantage for the manufacturer retailer and the whole dynamic closed-loop supply chain system to improve the performance if the manufacturer shoulder the collection responsibility and undertake the leadership status;5)in the end a two part tariff contract able to perfectly coordinate the decentralized dynamic closed-loop supply chain system is introduced to elevate the initiative of the retailer to participate the operation activities in CLSC by compensating the retailer's payoff while retaining the manufacturer' profit derived from recycling process.