Regulatory Policy,Reduction Of Major Shareholders And Corporate Value

The completion of the equity division reform made the capital market enter an era of “full circulation”.The free circulation of shares resulted in the transformation of the profitability of major shareholders,and major shareholders were increasingly concerned about the changes in the stock prices of the secondary market.In this context,the phenomenon of major shareholder vicious reduction and damage to the value of the company occurs frequently.The majority shareholder's profitability was reduced through the reduction of profits and the economic consequences were serious.The regulatory authorities continued to issue policies to restrict and regulate the behavior of major shareholders to reduce holdings.The China Securities Regulatory Commission [2017] Document No.9 was born.The article uses a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis and selects the shareholding reduction data and financial data of all A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2016 to 2017,to explore the timeliness of policies affecting the reduction of major shareholders and corporate value.The normative and empirical studies have obtained that there are a large number of major shareholder reductions in the current Chinese capital market,which have a significant negative impact on corporate value.Anyway,this phenomenon is even more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises.The new regulations on the reduction of shares held on May 27,2017 have resulted in a significant reduction in shareholdings reductions by major shareholders of listed companies,and the negative impact on corporate value has no longer been significant.It shows that the new regulations have strong policy effectiveness,strong ability to restrain shareholder reductions,and effectively protect the listed company's corporate value.The empirical study also found that the effectiveness of policy effectiveness is affected by the structure of property rights.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to policy punishment.And the equity concentration does not affect the behavior of major shareholders.The research significance of the article is to test the policy utility of the new regulations.Secondly,it demonstrates the nature of property rights and the role of shareholding concentration in the reduction of major shareholders' influence on corporate value.Finally,it provides data support and recommendations for the supervisory authority to deeply regulate the behavior of majorshareholders to reduce their holdings.