Research On The Path And Effect Of The Second Largest Shareholders Of State-owned Enterprises Participating In Corporate Governance

A new period of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China began in 2016.The main purpose of mixed ownership reform is to stimulate the vitality and competitiveness of state-owned enterprises.Nowadays,"one share is dominant" is very common in the listed companies of our country,including the state-owned listed companies.From the case of HENAN LOTUS FLOWER GOURMET POWDER CO,.LTD controlling shareholders occupying the capital of Listed Companies in 2004 to the case of Wuhan Department Store Group CO.,LTD and SILVERTIE HOLDING CO.,LTD competing for shares in 2010,the defects in corporate governance of state-owned listed companies are reflected.For the state-controlled listed companies,the state-owned major shareholders as the ultimate investors manage the company.The multi-principal-agent structure may lead to inefficient behavior,administration and owner "absence" in the state-owned enterprises,which leads to a series of corporate governance problems.Therefore,the foundation of the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises lies in the establishment of modern corporate governance system.In order to improve the phenomenon listed,it is a practical strategy to introduce non-state-owned capital as the second largest shareholder and change the ownership structure.In recent years,scholars at home and abroad have begun to pay attention to the second kind of principal-agent problem,the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and other shareholders.The second largest shareholder has the motivation to play a supervisory and balancing role to improve corporate governance.However,the introduction of non-state-owned capital into state-owned enterprises as the second largest shareholder can lead to new problems,excessive participation(infringement on the rights and interests of other shareholders as major shareholders,resulting in disputes over control rights)or insufficient participation(failure to effectively cooperate,and ultimately withdraw Cooperation).To solve the problem of excessive or insufficient participation,it is necessary to deeply analyze the path of the second largest shareholder in corporate governance.At present,there are few studies on the second largest shareholder's participation in corporate governance mechanism in the process of mixed ownership reform.In what ways do the second largest shareholders participate in corporate governance,how do they play a supervisory and balancing role,and how do they cooperate with state-owned enterprises,and what effect will these actions ultimately bring?At present,there is a lack of research in this area.Therefore,through the three cases of state-owned enterprises,CMST Development Co.,Ltd.,Lianhua Supermarket Holdings Co.LTD and Zhongbai Holdings Group Co.,Ltd.,this paper establishes an analytical framework on how the second largest shareholder participating in corporate governance and the effect of the second largest shareholder brings,and draws the following conclusions:(1)The core advantages of state-owned enterprises and strategic investors are the important reasons for maintaining stable cooperation between them;(2)The main ways for strategic investors to participate in the decision-making of state-owned enterprises by the second largest shareholder include dispatching directors and developing strategic cooperation;(3)The second largest shareholder may choose to withdraw from cooperation because the cooperation results are not as expected,or increasing shareholding leads to disputes over control rights because the cooperation effect is better.;(4)The enthusiasm of non-state-owned capital to participate in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises is affected by two main rights:decision-making rights and earning rights.