Analysis Of Related Party Transaction Tunnel Behavior Of Beisheng Pharmaceutical Co.LTD

Because of the background of Listed Companies in our country,the stock shares are highly concentrated,leading to the supervisory function of the board of supervisors and independent directors can not fully play.In addition,there is a lack of relevant laws to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders,the regulations on disclosure of related party transactions in our country are not perfect enough.Under such internal and external environments,controlling shareholders control the production and operation policies of listed companies with their special controlling position,embezzle the funds of listed companies through the tunnel behavior of related transactions,which seriously damages the legitimate interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and greatly undermines the confidence of the majority of small and medium-sized shareholders.This phenomenon is not only quite common,but also quite serious,as it illustrated by the vicious cases that have come to light in recent years.Guangxi Beisheng Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as the “Beisheng Pharmaceutical”)is a typical representative of this kind of companies.Because the controlling shareholders' illegal related transactions have been punished by the CSRC,gradually from a listed high-tech biopharmaceutical company that has been recognized by the ministry of science and technology of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese academy of sciences as "double high" to a company with bankruptcy reorganization and "ST" shares.Therefore,it is of certain reference value and significance to analyze the related transaction tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders of beisheng pharmaceutical company to avoid the recurrence of related transaction tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies in China.Through reading the relevant domestic and foreign literature,and using the method of induction and summary,the main points of the case study are sorted out,and the analysis framework of this paper is constructed.This article through five chapters content carries on the analysis to the entire case.Chapter one is the introduction,which introduces the background and significance of this case.On the basis of summarizing and reviewing the relevant literature on the related-party transaction tunneling behavior,the analysis logic of this paper is clarified and the research framework of this case is established.From the existing studies,we can see that most of the studies focus on the ways and reasons of the related-party transaction tunneling behavior,but not on the motivation of the related-party transaction tunneling behavior.Therefore,this paper takes the motivation of related-party transaction tunneling behavior as the starting point,hoping to provide some reference value and significance for preventing the recurrence of related-party transaction tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders of Listed Companies in China.Chapter two elaborates the related concepts of related-party transaction tunneling behavior,and briefly describes the theoretical basis of this study,which provides a theoretical basis for the following.Chapter three is an introduction to the case of Beisheng Pharmaceutical related-party transaction tunneling behavior.First,it gives a brief introduction to Beisheng Pharmaceutical and its ownership structure,and then it gives a detailed introduction to Beisheng Pharmaceutical related Parties and related Transactions.Chapter four analyses the motivation,means and economic consequences of Beisheng Pharmaceutical 's implementation of related party transaction tunneling behavior.Chapter five is based on the fourth chapter to summarize the related-party transaction tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders of Beisheng Pharmaceutical and then draw conclusions and inspiration and put forward relevant suggestions.In this paper,literature analysis and case analysis are used to study the related-party transaction tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders.In the part of literature analysis,it summarizes the research results of related-party transaction tunnel behavior by inductive method,elaborates the relevant theories,and provides theoretical basis for case analysis.In the case study part,the affiliated transaction behavior of Beisheng Pharmaceutical is selected as a case study,and through the case analysis of Beisheng Pharmaceutical,the following conclusions are drawn: First,related-party transactions are one of the important ways for controlling shareholders to excavate tunnels.Secondly,controlling shareholders implement related-party transactions tunneling behavior for earnings management motivation.Thirdly,controlling shareholders excavate through related-party transactions tunneling behavior,which has a significant negative impact on the company's market value and operating performance.