Research On The Impact Of Senior Executives' Audit Background On Audit Quality In Listed Companies

In recent years,owing to the accounting firms' disadvantages such as high pressure and fewer promotions,more and more auditors choose to join a listed company as senior executives.About that phenomenon,scholars call it as �revolving door�.However,in a series of financial collusion and fraud cases,it was found that the �revolving door� executives were excessively close to the accounting firms,resulting in the loss of investors and stakeholders,what's worse,causing the audit and supervision crisis.After that American regulators issued the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,and China's regulators issued the China Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants in 2010.Under the background of the supervision measures has been already issued,this paper aims to research whether and how the audit background of senior executives affect the audit quality,so as to enrich the domestic theories,improve the effectiveness of China's regulatory policies and improve the audit quality of listed companies.First of all,this paper adopts the analysis method of standard research to study the relationship between the audit background of senior executives and audit quality.The paper reviews the domestic and foreign scholars about the factors affecting audit quality,the measure of the audit quality and executive audit background literature.On the basis of this literature study,this paper introduces the principal-agent theory,game theory,high-level echelon theory,social behavior theory and other related theories,analyzes audit background of senior executives and audit quality afterwards,and then proposes the research hypothesis.Then,in the empirical research part,this paper selects the A-share listed companies in our country,from 2015 to 2017,and then chooses the relevant data as the research object.Based on the 4555 samples data,this paper carries out descriptive statistics analysis,correlation test,multivariate linear regression analysis,and by changing the variable measurement method for robustness test,then the empirical research results and research conclusions are obtained.The research results show that:(1)after �revolving door�,the auditor acts as the decision executives have no direct impact on the audit quality;(2)after the �revolving door�,the auditor acts as the supervisor,which will have a positive impact on the audit quality;(3)although there are relevant market supervision measures in China,the association senior executives which come from accounting firm are still significantly damaging the audit quality at the present stage in China.Finally,according to the related theories and empirical analysis results,some reasonable advices are proposed as following: adjusting the �cooling-off period� policy accordingly;strictly regulate the association senior executives which come from the accounting firms;improve the supervising senior executives' professional quality and assessment system;improve the compensation incentive mechanism for supervising senior executives;clarify the responsibilities of the audit committee through legislation.