Research On The Measurement Of Actual Control Rights And Its Relationship With Corporate Performance

The control index is the basic indicator of corporate governance research.It has been widely studied and applied in the second kind of agency problem,ownership structure,pyramid hierarchy,ownership concentration and so on.The control right is larger than the cash flow right,which is generally derived from the company's cross-shareholding structure,dual-shareholding,pyramid structure,etc.The problem of controlling shareholders'encroachment on the interests of small and medium shareholders caused by their serious deviation is called the second type of agency problem.In the relevant research,it is particularly important to ensure the accuracy and validity of basic indicators such as control rights.Aiming at the defect that the ultimate control right can't accurately measure the control level,this paper improves the statistical method,constructs the actual control right index,and tests its effectiveness.This paper continues the argumentation method under the measure of ultimate control rights,with the comparison of new and old indicators as the main line:direct comparison and indirect contrast analysis of actual control rights and ultimate control rights.The article selects the data of all A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as samples.Firstly,it makes a direct comparison between the actual control right and the ultimate control right in statistical value.Then,it uses the two-way fixed utility model to indirectly compare the old and new indicators,by analyzing its relationship with company performance.In the indirect comparative analysis,the article explores whether the old and new control rights indicators and the separation of the two powers have different effects on the company's performance.On the other hand,in the case of incorporating the old and new control rights indicators,the paper studies the impact of the different nature of the controllers on corporate performance.Finally,the article explores the operational mechanism of actual control rights,and verifies the important ways for the controller to conduct tunnel mining-shareholder occupation,and the actual amplification process of control rights,and the robustness test of the empirical process.The empirical results of this paper verify the validity of the actual control right,that is the actual control right more accurately measures the control level of the controller,and the higher the index,the more capable the controller is to tunnel,then the lower the company's performance.It also finds that the negative correlation between actual control rights and company performance is derived from the negative effect of excess control rights on company performance,and is far greater than the positive company performance income generated by the final ownership improvement.The greater the degree of separation between control rights and ownership,not only contributes to the behavior of large shareholders' interest embezzlement,such as the increase of shareholder occupation,but also is not conducive to the improvement of company output.That is,the higher the degree of separation of two rights,the more detrimental to the company's R&D and technological progress.The regression results of controller nature and company performance are both not significant,but the performance of state-owned holding company is significantly worse than that of private control company under the two-sample T test.The ultimate control ability of the controllers enlarges from the ultimate control level to the actual control level,which comes from the high dispersion of shares and the low participation of many small and medium-sized shareholders in the shareholders'meeting.According to the empirical results,the paper puts forward relevant enlightenment and suggestions:firstly,it affirms the validity of the actual control index and clarifies its significance for corporate governance research.The article puts forward to reduce the negative impact of the nature of the controllers on the company's performance,starting from the internal governance mechanism and the external environment.Propose to improve the internal organization management and transparency of major business matters through the improvement of the supervision mechanism,strengthen the supervision and restraint of laws and regulations,etc.,to stop the interest occupation of the controlling shareholders,promote the growth of total factor productivity.In dealing with the enlargement mechanism of actual control rights,it is mainly to improve the equity checks and balances,such as stimulating the enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to participate in corporate governance,and developing and improving the agent mechanism that represents the will of small and medium shareholders.In addition,the article also summarizes the inadequacies.For example,the preconditions for matching the proportion of director seats with actual control rights are not necessarily established,whether there are mediation effects such as tunnel mining between control rights and total factor productivity are not ascertained,and the validity of data itself,especially corporate performance indicators,is questionable.