Research On Commercial Credit Contract Of Nodal Enterprises In Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

Commercial credit refers to a kind of loan relationship between enterprises that allows deferred payment during the commodity transaction process.For suppliers,commercial credit,as an incentive and coordination mechanism,can be used to motivate retailers to increase order quantities and increase revenue.Retailers,by enjoying commercial credit,reduce their capital use and earn investment income.At present,most scholars pay less attention to the issue of commercial credit risk when studying the incentive and coordination role of commercial credit.Based on the incentive effect of commercial credit,this paper considers the commercial credit risk factor and studies the commercial credit contract problem that the retailer's order quantity is affected by the commercial credit period.In the practice of supply chain,asymmetric information phenomena are ubiquitous.The adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by information asymmetry will affect the coordinated operation of the supply chain and reduce the efficiency of the supply chain.With the strengthening of supply chain time and space dimension,the information asymmetry phenomenon and interest target conflicts of member companies in the supply chain have become more and more prominent.How to design reasonable contract and incentive mechanism to minimize information asymmetry The problem seems increasingly important and urgent.This paper considers the issue of commercial credit contract between suppliers and retailers in the case of retail sales effort level information asymmetry.The main research content includes the following aspects:First,the study of commercial credit contracts between suppliers and retailers in the case of information symmetry.Consider a secondary supply chain consisting of a supplier and a fund-constrained retailer.The supplier is the leader,the retailer is the follower and the level of sales efforts is high or low.With the goal of maximizing the profit of suppliers,the principal-agent theory and mechanism design theory are used to establish the commercial credit contract model under the condition of information symmetry and to derive the conditions for contract satisfaction.The results of the study indicate that the retailer's sales efforts are always affected by the upstream commercial credit period;regardless of the retailer's level of sales efforts,the supplieris willing to provide credit terms to its customers;compared to retailers with high sales efforts,Retailers with low sales efforts will get longer credit terms,and correspondingly,retailers will pay more for sales.Second,the study of commercial credit contracts between suppliers and retailers under asymmetric information.Consider the information asymmetry of retailers' sales efforts as their private information.Establish three different commercial credit contract mechanisms to avoid risks: screening,inspection,and insurance mechanisms,and find equilibrium solutions,which are compared with commercial credit contracts under symmetrical information.The results show that under the screening mechanism,in order to reduce the retailer's disguise motivation,the supplier reduces the credit period of the retailer with high sales effort level,and keeps the credit period of the retailer with low sales effort level unchanged and equal to the symmetric situation;Only when the inspection accuracy reaches a certain value will the supplier provide commercial credit to the high-sales effort level retailer.For the low-sales effort level retailer,the supplier will always provide commercial credit and the credit period is greater than the information symmetry situation;the insurance mechanism Under the above,when the insurance premium rate is lower than a certain value,the supplier will provide commercial credit,and the credit period of the retailer with low sales effort level is less than the symmetrical situation;under the three mechanisms,the credit period of the retailer with high sales effort level is less than Symmetrical situation;the retailer's level of sales effort increases(decreases)as the credit term increases(decreases).Third,compare the characteristics of commercial credit under the three mechanisms,the optimal mechanism selection of suppliers and the impact of changes in business environment on the node enterprise strategy.The results of the study show that for retailers with low sales efforts,the commercial credit period provided by the supplier under the insurance mechanism is the shortest,while the commercial credit period provided by the supplier under the inspection mechanism is the longest;for the retailer with high sales effort level,the screening The optimal credit period under the mechanism is less than the optimal credit period under the inspection mechanism.Under the insurance mechanism,when the insurance premium falls below a certainvalue,the credit period is higher than the other two mechanisms.When the inspection cost of the supplier reaches a higher inspection accuracy,the inspection mechanism is adopted.When the insurance premium rate is lower than a certain value,the insurance mechanism is adopted;the supplier profit increases with the increase of the market price,and the production cost increases.Decrease,when the market price reaches a certain value,the retailer will accept the contract and the value is different under different mechanisms.When the production cost reaches a certain value,the supplier reduces the commercial credit use for controlling the risk and the value is different under different mechanisms.