The Game Analysis Of Trade Protection And Trade Freedom Policy In International Business

With the increasingly frequent international trade exchanges,and international trade disputes are also increasing.Under this background,it is significance that study the game equilibrium in international trade.Since the financial crisis,the economic recover of various countries has varied,leading to the rise of trade protectionism,because the means of trade protection continue to innovate,the invisibility and flexibility have been enhanced,which seriously damaged the normal order of international trade,and caused great losses to both sides.Therefore,the focus of thesis is how to create stable international trade environment.Thesis mainly analyzes the background and development course of trade protection,and makes an in-depth study on the trade protection behavior in international commerce on the basis of the existing literature.The purpose of thesis is to study some practical problems in international trade by using evolutionary game theory,and establish the replicator dynamic equation and evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behavior of both sides of the game through reasonable assumptions.Firstly,through the establishment of the evolutionary game model and the analysis of the strategic behavior of both parties in the current international environment.It is concluded that the participants cannot reach the stable state of trade freedom under natural conditions(ie,WTO cannot intervention),which theoretically explains the necessity of WTO's active participation in international trade,It is also provides that theoretical support for the existence of WTO.Secondly,on the basis of the above model,the game model of both sides of trade under the participation of WTO is established,and the strategic behavior of both sides of the game is analyzed according to the parameters of the model.It is concluded that when the punishment of the WTO is large,it is possible for both sides of the game to reach the stable state of trade freedom,and appropriate incentive policy will also promote the formation of this stable state,so the parallel of WTO punishment and incentive policy is the key to creating a good international tradeenvironment.Finally,based on the research content and the analysis of the model results,the policy recommendations of protecting the normal order of international trade are proposed in a targeted manner,so that international trade tend to be more stable.