Evolutionary Game Theory Of International Trade Disputes

Since the era of mankind into the global trade, trade disputes have occurred frequently. This paper attempts to introduce the evolutionary game theory and the method of comparative historical analysis, to study the generation of trade disputes, the choice of national trade policies, and the international trade regime. In the introduction, this study first sets out the background and significance of the object. Domestic and foreign scholars in different studies obtain different results. Then we use the theoretical analysis, from both the game of domestic interest groups and the inter-national game, to determine the assumptions, the establishment of game theory model, according to game results derived with the theoretical analysis of international trade. Then presented the history of this comparative analysis of the selected specific cases - England and France during the 18th century to 19th century. By this time Britain and France on the process of trade disputes, trade policy options and their changes compared with the background of the specific analysis. And we extend the theoretical model, combined with the specific historical, discuss the parameters of the changes brought about changes in game balance. The innovation of this paper is that the evolutionary game theory and comparative historical analysis into the study of international trade disputes. Previous study focused only on static equilibrium analysis of different time and space, this article attempts a historical, evolutionary, dynamic perspective of international trade disputes up the generation and solution process. This article is not using mainstream mathematical statistics based on regression analysis and measurement methods, instead of using a combination of theory and history, comprehensive analysis and study on this on the establishment and evolution of the system. We conclude that the generation of international trade disputes and settlement is the interest groups and the results of dynamic game between countries. The evolution of the international trading system is spontaneous, not designed.