An Evolutionary Game Research On Environmental Standard From International Trade Angle

The research based on Evolutionary Game Theory, which take the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) as the core and the bounded rationality as the premise. In order to analyze, we classify the players into two different groups by value of international trade, one is big trade countries group, the0ther one is small trade countries group, so, in the research, it contains two type games, and one is asymmetry game, which concerns on the different groups, the other one is symmetry game, which focuses on each internal game of big trade countries group and small countries group. Then, we analyze the behavior of individual member from each type in environmental standard choice. By analyzing, we try to find the track and stable state of environmental standard choice. In conclusion, when we just consider the game between big trade countries and small trade countries, we find that big trade countries are apt to choose strict environmental standard, and the small trade countries are apt to choose loose environmental standard; when we just consider the internal game of big trade countries group, we find that some countries are apt to choose the best strict environmental standard and the other countries are not, the proportion is decided by the value from international trade and the lose from environmental standard; when we just consider the internal game of small trade countries group, we find that the environmental standard will enhance if the value from international trade exceed the lose from environmental standard, but the upward power can't keep on day after day because the small trade countries are face to the threat from big trade countries.