The Research On The Relationship Between Compensation Stickiness And Property Rights Of A-Share Listed Companies In China

The problem of executive compensation has always been a hot topic in theoretical and practical fields.As a link to maintain the common interests of both operators and owners,executive compensation system plays a significant role in alleviating the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of powers.However,the disclosure of the sky-high executive compensation event has led researchers to pay attention to the rationality and necessity of the executive high salary,focusing on whether the executive's ability and effort level match the executive compensation and whether the executive compensation is related to the corporate performance.The earlier studies found that the correlation between the two is weak or even completely irrelevant,while the later studies mostly found that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance.In the process of scholars' research on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance,some scholars have found that executive compensation shows asymmetric sensitivity to different corporate performance,which is specifically reflected in that the performance sensitivity of executive compensation when corporate performance rises is greater than that when corporate performance drops.And that is what we call the stickiness of executive compensation now.The characteristic of stickiness of executive compensation is a form of principal-agent problem.It can be explained and analyzed from the perspectives of principal-agent theory,incentive theory,management power theory,human capital theory and attribution theory.Considering the special institutional background of China,whether the property nature will have an impact on the stickiness of executive compensation,and whether there is a difference in the stickiness of executive compensation in listed companies with different property nature is a unique starting point for the research on the stickiness of executive compensation.In the same listed company,whether the stickiness between executive compensation and different performance is also worth attention.Based on the summarization of relevant theories and literature on executive compensation,combined with the unique institutional background of China,we select A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as the research object to confirm whether there is performance sensitivity and stickiness in executive compensation of China's listed companies.Also,through the comprehensive application of descriptive statistics and regression analysis,we study the influence of property rights on the characteristics of executive compensation stickiness and briefly explore the time trend of the stickiness of executive compensation.Finally,we propose suggestions from the perspective of corporate governance mechanism on the stickiness of executive compensation.Research shows :(1)There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in China's listed companies;(2)The performance sensitivity of executive compensation is asymmetric,which is shown like the increase of executive compensation when the enterprise performance rises is greater than the decrease of executive compensation when the enterprise performance drops.Obviously,there is stickiness in executive compensation.(3)Executive compensation of state-owned listed companies shows a more significant characteristic of stickiness than that of non-state-owned listed companies.As time goes on,the stickiness of executive compensation in listed companies tends to weaken.(4)At the same time,the stickiness of executive compensation in state-owned listed companies related to risk performance is more significant.Based on the above research results,we believe that the compensation stickiness can be suppressed by improving the information disclosure system and corporate governance system,optimizing the compensation structure and other methods.Only in this way can executive compensation system give full play in motivating and restraining senior executives.Due to limited time and ability,this paper only conducts relevant research based on the executive monetary compensation and accounting performance indicators disclosed in the annual reports of listed companies.