| In the 21st century,the integration of life,culture and economy is becoming more and more common among countries in the world.In such a new era,the company’s competitors have long been not only domestic enterprises,but also to pay attention to the dynamics of overseas markets.Mergers and reorganizations provide a way for companies to expand.In addition,as a business strategy,merger and reorganization not only makes enterprises see the possibility of transformation or expansion,but more importantly,the overall industrial composition of a country is also a symbol of its strength.Therefore,in China,which urgently needs to improve its image and strength,merger and reorganization has also become one of the objects encouraged by the state.Under the influence of this,enterprise merger and reorganization has become a "trend".Practice drives the evolution of theory.In the field of management,scholars have been studying the merger and acquisition of listed companies.In the branch of executive income,there is evidence that corporate merger and reorganization has become a means for executives to obtain private gains.To be specific,after the merger initiated or completed by corporate executives,the company’s operating conditions did not get better,but the income of senior executives increased significantly after the merger!Since China’s state-owned enterprises implement the salary restriction system for senior executives,the income of senior executives may not increase significantly before and after mergers and acquisitions.Then what is the sensitivity between the income of senior executives of state-owned enterprises and corporate performance?Based on this premise,this paper studies the sensitivity of executive income and performance during and after mergers and acquisitions between non-state-owned controlled listed companies and state-owned controlled listed companies.As companies mergers and acquisitions,not A year can be completed,taking 2016 as the boundary,selected from 2013 to 2016,successfully launched M&A of a-share listed companies as the research object,research the following questions:(1)the merger happens,non-state control of listed companies and state control of the executive compensation of listed companies performance sensitivity changes whether there was A significant difference?(2)After mergers and acquisitions,is the increase in executive compensation of non-state-owned controlled listed companies and state-owned controlled listed companies caused by the increase in corporate performance or the increase in the size of the company?Combining the two dimensions of executive compensation and theoretical analysis,this paper proposes the following hypotheses:(1)when mergers and acquisitions occur,the monetary compensation and performance sensitivity of executives in non-state-owned controlled listed companies increase significantly higher than that of state-owned controlled listed companies;(2)When mergers and acquisitions occur,the in-service consumption and performance sensitivity of non-state-owned controlled listed companies increase significantly higher than that of state-owned controlled listed companies;(3)After merger and acquisition,the increase of monetary compensation of executives of non-state-owned controlled listed companies is caused by the increase of corporate performance and scale;(4)After merger and acquisition,the increase of monetary compensation of executives in state-owned controlled listed companies is mainly caused by the increase of company size;(5)After merger and acquisition,the increase of in-service consumption of executives of non-state-owned controlled listed companies is caused by the increase of corporate performance and scale;(6)After the merger and acquisition,the increase of in-service consumption of senior executives of state-owned controlled listed companies is mainly caused by the increase in the size of the company.Compared to the innovation of this article lies in the existing research,based on the M&A motivation of manager,in mergers and acquisitions point hierarchical multiple regression analysis using the double difference model,group after the merger of multiple regression analysis methods include property right nature,executives on-the-job consumption in research scope,to some extent enrich the research content.The research method of this paper is empirical research multiple regression method,and the content is arranged as follows:Chapter 1 is the significance and background of the topic,research objective,content and method,and research framework;Chapter two,literature review,including literature review and combing;The third chapter is the relevant theories involved in the research,combined with the analysis of the problems,leading to the hypothesis verified by the empirical evidence in this paper;The fourth chapter is the research design.Aiming at the problems in this paper,the double difference model(1)(2)is constructed by combining the two dimensions of executive income from the perspective of observation at the time of merger and acquisition,and the model(3)and(4)are further analyzed.Then,explanatory variables,explained variables and control variables are selected,and more appropriate variables are selected on the basis of previous experience.Then,descriptive statistics,correlation test,multiple regression,further analysis,and robustness test.Chapter six,conclusion and prospect.The findings mainly include:(1)when M&A occurs,the executive salary-performance sensitivity does not significantly increase or decrease in the whole listed company.(2)When mergers and acquisitions occur,the increase of monetary compensation and performance sensitivity of executives shows no significant difference among different groups of listed companies.However,in state-owned controlled listed companies,the increase of executive consumption and performance sensitivity is significantly lower than that in non-state-owned controlled listed companies.(3)After merger and acquisition,the increase of executive compensation of non-state-owned controlled listed companies is caused by the increase of corporate performance and scale,but the correlation between the increase of compensation and performance is not close enough;(4)The increase in executive compensation of state-owned controlled listed companies is mainly caused by the increase in the size of the company,indicating that executives of state-owned controlled listed companies have stronger motivation for private gains. |
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