Large Shareholder's Tunneling,Institutional Investor Ownership And Quality Of Performance Forecast Disclosure

At the end of January 2019,a number of A-share listed companies' performance thunderbolts triggered violent shocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets,and the quality of performance forecast disclosure of listed companies once again became the focus of academic attention.In theory,the information disclosure system can effectively alleviate the second kind of agency problems,reduce information asymmetry,and is conducive to the daily stability of the capital market.However,the information disclosed by the performance forecast has a certain degree of subjective predictability,which is likely to be affected by the subjective consciousness of the management.In order to seek their own private interests,stakeholders,mainly major shareholders,often take the initiative to intervene in the performance forecast of management,thus reducing the quality of performance forecast disclosure.Such intervention is usually associated with the tunneling behavior of large shareholders.When tunneling behavior is exposed,listed companies will not only be investigated and punished by the SFC,but also face huge litigation risks.High quality performance forecast can reveal the trace of tunneling behavior in advance to some extent.For the self-interest purposes of stock price manipulation,high cash arbitrage,tunneling enterprises,will the major shareholders use their own rights to induce coercion or collude with management to manipulate the disclosure of performance forecasts?In view of this,the continuous improvement of performance forecast disclosure system is particularly important,and the role of institutional investors in improving corporate governance mechanism can not be underestimated.So,does institutional investors' shareholding also play a restraining role in the quality of performance forecast disclosure of large shareholders' tunneling damage? In addition,will heterogeneous institutional investors have different governance effects?Based on the particularity of China's capital market and the performance forecasting system,this paper uses the method of normative and empirical research to verify the impact of tunneling behavior of large shareholders on the quality of performance forecasting disclosure by using the sample data of performance forecasting of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2013 to2017.At the same time,it also verifies the restraining effect of institutional investors' Shareholding on the above-mentioned impact.The findings are as follows:(1)There is a negative correlation between the tunneling behavior of major shareholders and the quality of performance forecast disclosure.The more serious the tunneling is,the more likely the major shareholders will control and induce the management or merge with the management to manipulate the publication of performance forecast,which will damage the quality of performance forecast disclosure.(2)Institutional investors' total shareholding plays a restraining role in the damage of large shareholders' tunneling to the quality of performance forecast disclosure,and the proportion of shares held is positively correlated with the restraining effect.(3)Heterogeneous institutional investors exert different governance effects.Pressure-resistant institutional investors can restrain the negative correlation between tunneling of large shareholders and the quality of performance forecast,while pressure-sensitive institutional investors have no significant effect.This study provides a useful reference for government departments to strengthen the supervision of listed companies' performance announcement disclosure and rational investment decision-making of small and medium-sized investors.