| Since the reform and opening up policy implementation,private sector of China’s econormy is becoming increasingly important economically.However,subject to the defects of the institutional environment,private enterprises still face many development constraints.How to promote the development of private enterprises draws extensive attention.Among the various forms,state’equity participation of private enterprises is a common assistant means.Nowadays,state-owned capital and private capital coexist and complement one another in many economic fields.Compared with the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,private enterprises’ behavior of introducing state-owned shareholders to redesign ownership arrangement for the purpose of building political connection draws less attention.Thus,based on the trend of the combination of public and private capital and the macro background of China’s economy,this paper discusses the impact of state’equity participation on the innovation behavior of private enterprises.Based on the disciplinary knowledge of finance,economics and political science,with the 2009-2016 private listed companies on GEM as research samples,this paper focuses on the government shareholding behavior,deconstructs the whole process of innovation activities into three dimensions,which are respectively innovation input,innovation efficiency and innovation output,and discusses the influence of government shareholding on the above-mentioned different innovation stages.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows.Firstly,government shareholding has both positive and negative effects on the innovation activities of private enterprises,but on the whole it plays a negative role.Secondly,the positive effect of government shareholding is reflected in the initial stage of innovation activities.On the one hand?it will encourage more investments in innovation.On the other hand,it will change the allocation of enterprise innovation resources.Private enterprises will devote more resources to pursuing“the quality of innovation",and discourage the behavior of;“innovation by numbers”.Thirdly,the negative effect of government shareholding is reflected in the transformation stage of innovation activities.The efficiency loss will offset the positive effect of resource effect.Private enterprises with government shareholding will have higher agency cost,employ more employees and pay higher wages,which may be potential sources of ineffective allocation of innovation resources.Finally,combined with the influence on innovation input and innovation efficiency,tthe government shareholding reduces the number of patents,which is mainly caused by the reduction of number of utility model patents and design patents.Although the resource allocated to develop patents for inventions increases,the efficiency loss offsets this positive effect.No matter in the short term or in the long term,this paper does not find that government shareholding increases the number of patents for inventions of private enterprises.This paper further studies the relationship bet-ween patents and corporate value,and from the perspective of innovation,government shareholding damages the corporate value of private enterprises.The reverse mixed-ownership reform can not realize the complementary advantages,and eventually leads to the invalid allocation of resources.How to reduce government’s intervention,the political rent-seeking behavior and moral hazard caused by the political connection is the point.Considering the policy background of private enterprises’bailout since the beginning of last year,only alleviating the short-term risks of private enterprises through government credit endorsement,while ignoring complex issues such as subsequent political intervention and distortion of corporate incentives,may even ultimately prove counterproductive.Strengthening market construction and reducing the leading role of government in resource allocation,is the fundamental way to break the dilemma of private enterprises. |
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