Research On The Relationship Among Executive Compensation Gap,R&D Expenditure And Enterprise Competitiveness

Under the goal of building an innovative country,developing a high-quality real economy and improving international competitiveness,the state vigorously promotes R&D innovation.Enterprise is the main body of innovation,and management is the main decision maker of enterprise innovation.How to motivate executives to increase R&D expenditure and improve the competitiveness of enterprises has become the focus of attention of the practical and theoretical circles.Monetary salary incentive as the most intuitive and effective incentive means for executives has been recognized by enterprises and scholars.Based on the championship theory and social comparison theory,this paper explores the influence of internal and external pay gap on enterprise competitiveness and R&D expenditure,examines whether R&D expenditure plays a mediating role between the pay gap and enterprise competitiveness,and analyses its regulatory effect from the nature of enterprise property rights and the difference of executive education background,which has certain effect on increasing R&D expenditure and improving enterprise competitiveness.The theoretical value and practical significance.Taking non-financial A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as samples,this paper uses the ordinary least squares method(OLS)to empirically demonstrate that: firstly,the internal pay gap and external positive pay gap of senior executives significantly increase R&D expenditure and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises.The external negative pay gap significantly inhibits the competitiveness of enterprises and the growth of R&D expenditure,which verifies the rationality of the championship theory and social comparison theory.Secondly,R&D expenditure plays a part of intermediary effect between internal and external pay gap of senior management team and enterprise competitiveness.When there is an internal pay gap and a positive pay gap,executives will increase R&D expenditure to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises;when there is a negative pay gap,executives will reduce R&D expenditure to hinder the growth of competitiveness of enterprises.Thirdly,the nature of state-owned property rights will negatively regulate the pay gap between core executives and non-core executives,the negative pay gap outside executives and the competitiveness of enterprises,and it is not sensitive to the other two pay gaps.Educational background differences can only play a negative regulatory role in the relationship between internal pay differences and enterprise competitiveness,but not significantly adjust the impact of external pay gap on enterprise competitiveness.The incentive effect of internal pay gap and external positive pay gap promotes executives to work harder,improve risk tolerance,expand research and development projects,and improve the competitiveness of enterprises.The negative external pay gap of senior managers will reduce their self-evaluation,passive idleness,avoid innovation risks,reduce R&D expenditure,and hinder the competitiveness of enterprises.These conclusions enrich the relevant literature research,especially provide data support for small and medium-sized enterprises with imperfect salary system to set up salary gap,clarify the mechanism between executive salary gap and enterprise competitiveness,and further understand the transmission role of R&D expenditure between the two.By investigating the regulatory variables,this paper provides suggestions for enterprises to improve the incentive mechanism for executives and build a healthy competitive senior management team to increase R&D expenditure and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises.