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Can The Appointment Of Directors By Non-state Shareholders Actually Improve Company Performance?

Posted on:2020-12-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X MengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330575480648Subject:Financial analyst direction
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As an important breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,hybrid ownership reform aims to improve corporate performance by improving corporate governance;However,simply reducing the proportion of state-owned shares can not improve corporate governance.Improving the equity balance of state-owned enterprises at the governance level is the breakthrough for state-owned enterprises 'mixed ownership reform.Non-state shareholders appoint board members to form a special equity balance in the board of directors has great significance for company performance.This paper draws on the research experience of previous scholars,such as the impact of equity balance,board governance and non-state-owned shareholders' participation in corporate governance on corporate performance,and looks for links between the appointment of directors and corporate performance by non-state-owned shareholders at the governance level.Using relevant theories,we will explore effective means of corporate governance,construct a theoretical framework for non-state-owned shareholders to appoint directors to act on corporate performance,and analyze the theoretical aspects of corporate governance in the case that a pure reduction in the proportion of state-owned shares can not effectively improve corporate governance.The selection of non-state-owned shareholders to appoint directors is an effective way to solve the governance problem of hybrid enterprises.In the past,most scholars have studied the relationship between non-state shareholders and corporate performance through empirical studies,and few scholars have proved it through cases.Based on this,this paper selects China Unicom as the research object,introduces the design of corporate governance in the two stages of mixed ownership reform,and compares and analyzes the two stages.It is found that non-state-owned shareholders appoint directors in the two stages.From the perspective of appointing directors of non-state shareholders,this paper explains the phenomenon of "over-appointing directors" in particular,and finally compares financial performance with market performance.This paper finds that equity checks and balances are positively related to company performance;Non-state-owned shareholders appoint directors to improve equity checks and balances at the board level,which can improve corporate governance and improve corporate performance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Mixed ownership reform, Equity checks and balances, Non-state shareholders appoint directors, Corporate performance
PDF Full Text Request
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