| At present,the development of state-owned enterprises has entered a new stage,and the reform of state-owned enterprises has entered the critical period and the "deep water zone".In the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,it was clearly stated that it is necessary to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and develop a mixed-ownership economy.Therefore,exploring the next step to deepen the direction and promotion of state-owned enterprise reform will be a realistic problem before the theoretical and business interfaces.As the manager of the daily business activities of the enterprise,the executives of the strategic goals of the enterprise play a very important role in the state-owned enterprises.However,due to the complexity of the principal-agent problem of the state-owned enterprises,the state-owned capital has the largest number of principals and agents.The longest chain,the state-owned capital principal has the duality of objectives,that is,economic goals and non-economic goals,and the senior manager acting as an agent may generate moral hazard due to information asymmetry,deviating from the economic goals or non-economic goals of the principal.And adverse selection issues.Therefore,in order to solve the problems brought about by the principal-agent relationship of the state-owned capital of the enterprise,the interests of the principals of the state-owned enterprises and the senior managers are consistent,so that the behavior of the senior managers contributes to the goal of the state-owned enterprises,and it is necessary to establish them in the state-owned enterprises.Effective executive performance appraisal mechanism.The research content of this paper is divided into six parts.The first chapter is the introduction part.Firstly,it introduces the role and importance of state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprise systems in the process of China's economic and social development,and then briefly describes the internal pairs of state-owned enterprises.The status quo of the performance evaluation of senior managers,then introduces the research purpose and significance of the research,the framework of the paper,research ideas and methods,and possible innovations.The secoind chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review.This paper mainly studies the performance evaluation of senior managers based on the principal-agent theory and the idea of balanced scorecards.It describes in detail the process of China's state-owned enterprises' mixed ownership reform and the evaluation of senior managers'performance.The research was reviewed.The third chapter is to build a high-level manager performance evaluation system,which considers the impact of the internal governance structure of the state-owned enterprise and the external market environment on the performance evaluation of senior managers,follows the principle of index selection,and selects the corresponding four dimensions based on the idea of balanced scorecard.The indicators establish a scientific performance evaluation system.The fourth chapter is to establish a performance evaluation model for senior managers.Using the analytic hierarchy process,a three-level performance evaluation model is established.The expert scoring method is used to construct the judgment matrix,and the weights of each level of indicators are obtained.The performance evaluation model of the senior manager established in the fifth chapter is applied to the actual enterprise,and the performance of the general manager of the case company in 2017 is evaluated.The sixth part is the research conclusion,management inspiration and research prospects.It summarizes and analyzes the research results of this paper,and puts forward some suggestions for the implementation of the performance evaluation of senior managers of state-owned enterprises in the context of mixed ownership reform.At the same time,it points out the inadequacies of this research and the future.The research makes a vision.Based on mixed ownership reform as the research background,state-owned enterprise top managers as the research object,with theory and ideas of balanced scorecard trust-agent theory as the theoretical basis,research the top manager performance evaluation problems,in this article from the four dimensions to select the appropriate indicators,constructs the evaluation system for senior managers,selected the financial dimension:EVA,return on sales,operating income,net income and net assets yield five indexes,customer satisfaction,customer loyalty is customer dimension chosen,new customer acquisition rate and market share targets four indicators,internal process dimension to select the qualified rate of products,research and development expenses rate,research and development of project completion and after-sales service satisfaction four indicators,learning and growth dimension to choose the number of average employee satisfaction,employee training,employee average training time three indicators.When constructing the performance evaluation model,AHP was used to assign reasonable weights to each dimension and index:it was concluded that the financial index weight was 52.34%,the customer index weight was 26.1 1%,the internal process index weight was 12.61%,and the learning and growth index weight was 8.94%.Finally,the performance evaluation model is used to evaluate the operating performance of the general manager of H company,whose score is 86.66,which is at a good level.Finally,combining with irelevant theories and aiming at the performance evaluation of senior managers of state-owned enterprises,the following management Suggestions are drawn:gradually improve the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises and establish and improve the board of directors system;At the same time actively explore the state-owned enterprise senior manager performance appraisal system;Actively promote the formation of professional manager market,and promote the marketization,specialization and professionalization of senior managers. |
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