Research On The Relationship Between Financial Situation And Tunneling Behavior From Anti-corruption Perspective

China is a country with a highly concentrated ownership structure.On the one hand,the incentive for controlling shareholders to supervise the behaviors of the management will be increased;on the other hand,large shareholders will use the convenience of control rights to infringe the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.As an emerging economy in the transition period,China's legal system is more incomplete than that of western countries,and its implementation efficiency is also lower.The law does not have enough protection for small and medium-sized investors,so it cannot effectively restrain the behavior of large shareholders to protect the rights and interests of enterprises and small and medium-sized shareholders.The tunneling behavior of major shareholders is a self-interested behavior at the cost of the long-term development of the enterprise and the interest demands of small and medium-sized shareholders,which will seriously damage investor confidence,affect enterprise performance and disturb the order of the capital market.Scholars at home and abroad,therefore,was hollowed big shareholders launched research motivation and restriction mechanism,increase the proportion of independent directors on the board,and balances equity and management equity and external audit can limit the hollowed behavior of major shareholders,but has failed to empty from the behavior of dynamic mechanism study on give a good answer.This paper argues that tunneling of major shareholders has timing preference,which is related to the financial status of listed companies.When listed companies in the financial crisis,financial balance and financial idle state,whether large shareholders tunneled assets and emptying the degree is different,this paper can provide reference for listed companies in different stages and effectively restrain tunneling behavior of large shareholders.Based on this,this paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2017 as the research object,and explores the relationship between the financial situation and the tunneling behavior of major shareholders through theoretical analysis and empirical research,as well as the regulating effect of anti-corruption on the relationship between the two.Firstly,on the basis of previous studies,this paper divides listed companies into financial crisis enterprises,financial balance enterprises and financial idle enterprises through cluster analysis.Secondly,in order to avoid endogenous influence,this paper chooses to use simultaneous equations regression model for empirical test.Finally,use anti-corruption to divides full sample into high and low grouping,to test the moderating effect of anti-corruption.In order to further study the means differences of major shareholders with different degrees of control,this paper divides controlling shareholders into four categories: general influence,relative influence,significant influence and absolute influence,and studies the differences in tunneling modes.The main research conclusions of this paper are as follows: Firstly,Major shareholders will choose to tunneling the corporate assets in the financial crisis state of the listed company,because the profitability of the enterprise at this time is difficult to meet the psychological expectations of major shareholders;However,in the state of financial balance and financial idleness of listed companies,the interests of major shareholders are similar to those of enterprises and small and medium-sized shareholders,and tunneling will not be adopted.Secondly,The extent of tunneling of major shareholders in private enterprises is higher than that of state-owned enterprises.Because there are many restrictions,such as national policies,in state-owned enterprises,while the major shareholders in private enterprises can truly "take charge".Thirdly,Anti-corruption significantly inhibits tunneling behavior of major shareholders in enterprises with financial crisis.With the strengthening of anti-corruption in the social environment,the tunneling cost and risk of major shareholders will also increase,which will further restrain their behaviors and avoid their misconduct being exposed.Finally,Compared with major shareholders who can only generally influence the decisions of listed companies,absolute controlling shareholders have more options to tunneling corporate assets,including labor transaction,capital transaction,principal-agent and guarantee mortgage;And the major shareholders who generally affect the enterprise choose leasing transaction more.This paper shows that the tunneling behavior of major shareholders is indeed related to the financial status of listed companies,which provides a reference for the corporate governance of listed companies in different financial stages,and has important theoretical and practical significance for fully understanding the motivation and timing of tunneling behavior of major shareholders.