The Quality Of Information Disclosure, The Financial Background Of The Board Secretary And The Valuation Bias Of The Capital Market

In securities market transactions,the long-term deviation of stock market value from its intrinsic value not only affects investors' reasonable judgment on investment decisions,but also hinders the sustainable and healthy development of capital market.Information asymmetry is the decisive factor that causes the stock price to deviate from its intrinsic value for a long time.In the real market transactions,information disclosure is the most important way to alleviate the information asymmetry in the capital market.The quality of information disclosure largely determines the investors' value judgment and choice of the invested company.As the main person responsible for the information disclosure of listed companies,the Secretary of the board of directors with financial related professional background has entered the work of listed companies more and more frequently in recent years.Can the quality of information disclosure in China affect and how to correct the valuation errors in the capital market?Has the financial background of the Secretary of the board of directors played a moderating role?Strengthening the research on these problems can not only make investors and other external information users make more scientific investment decisions,alleviate the valuation errors of stock price deviating from the intrinsic value,but also promote the healthy development of capital market and improve the rational allocation efficiency of resources.Based on the efficient market hypothesis,information asymmetry theory,high-echelon theory,signal transmission theory and intrinsic value theory,this paper studies the relationship and influence between the quality of information disclosure,the financial background of the Secretary of the board of directors and the valuation errors of the capital market by using the method of literature research and empirical analysis,and further explores the correction of the quality of information disclosure.The main way for stock price to deviate from its intrinsic value.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange of China from 2013 to 2016,this paper firstly uses the residual income model to measure the intrinsic value of listed companies,and then constructs the proxy variable of capital market valuation errors as the explanatory variable.At the same time,it uses the evaluation coefficient of Shenzhen Stock Exchange to measure the quality of information disclosure of Listed Companies in general.On the basis of empirical analysis,this paper examines the impact of listed companies' information disclosure on capital market valuation errors.At the same time,this paper explores whether the financial background of the Secretary of the board of directors has a moderating effect on the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and capital market valuation errors.Finally,the paper conducts an expansibility study and further investigates the basic methods of correcting the deviation of the market value of listed companies from their intrinsic value by the quality of information disclosure.The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the quality of information disclosure and the valuation bias of capital market,that is,the higher the quality of information disclosure,the smaller the deviation from the intrinsic value of listed companies,and vice versa.At the same time,under the condition that the Secretary of the board of directors has financial background,the quality of information disclosure has a more significant impact on reducing the degree of capital market valuation bias.It is further concluded that the way to correct the valuation bias of information disclosure quality is to alleviate the stock price overvaluation of the market bubble.Based on the above discussion,this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations:The state should further enrich and improve the information disclosure system of listed companies;Listed companies should improve the Board Secretary system and employ board secretaries with financial and other related professional background;Regulators should enrich and improve the securities market supervision and protection mechanism,and improve the quality of external audit.