Institutional Investors Characteristics,the Gap Of Internal Salary Of Management And Non-Efficiency Investment

At present,domestic listed companies regard investment activities as a very important part of the company's production and management when managing financial activities.It is related to the company's profitability and the stability of cash flow,which ultimately affects the company's development and growth;The first step in making a decision is the cornerstone of a company's sustainable development.However,as the company's continuous development and growth,the separation of ownership and management rights makes the management of the actual management enterprise and the interests of all people conflict,resulting in management decisions made by managers deviating from the goal of maximizing the value of the company,resulting in The continuous decline in investment efficiency has led to the emergence of non-efficiency investment issues.In recent years,scholars have studied the relationship between management incentives and firm performance based on principal-agent theory.However,few scholars have joined the intermediate factors to examine the relationship between management incentives and firm performance.Some scholars' research conclusions are also inconsistent.Therefore,this paper explores the path of management incentives affecting corporate performance from the perspective of inefficient investment of intermediate factors,and tests whether this impact path is established.Therefore,this paper considers the research to be of practical significance.From the research that has been stimulated by research management,it is limited to explicit salary incentive executive compensation level and implicit compensation incentive equity incentive,and rarely mentions the salary gap of executive compensation.Based on the above findings,this paper examines the relationship between executive pay gaps and non-efficiency investments: What impact does the pay gap between executives at different levels have on non-efficiency investments? Does the institutional shareholding affect the relationship between the internal management pay gap and the non-efficiency investment of senior management,and what role does the different types of institutional investors play in the relationship between the two?This paper takes the 2013-17 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a research sample,and through the combination of theoretical research and empirical research,examines the impact of the internal compensation gap of executives on the inefficient investment of listed companies,and explores institutional investment.Whether the characteristics of the feature will affect the relationship between the two.The research findings of this paper are as follows:(1)The internal salary gap of executives can restrain the occurrence of non-efficiency investment behaviors;(2)It is found that the overall shareholding of institutional investors can strengthen the internal compensation gap of executives.Inhibition of non-efficiency investments.(3)When this paper examines the types of institutional investors,the empirical results prove that the higher the shareholding ratio of listed companies' pressure-resistant institutional investors,the stronger the internal compensation gap of executives will inhibit the non-efficiency investment;and the pressure-sensitive type Institutional investors do not affect the relationship between executive pay gaps and non-efficiency investments.Finally,based on the results of empirical research,this paper proposes and improves the salary incentive mechanism,the improvement of the professional manager market,and the diversified development of institutional investors.