Pricing Strategy Of Two-sided Platform On Different Market Structure

The third industrial revolution,computer and information technology revolution,has improved production efficiency,optimized the allocation of resources,and greatly promoted the development of society and economy.Among them,the development of information technology is particularly rapid.The Internet not only improves the production efficiency,but also changes people's thinking and consumption habits.Therefore,under the penetration of the Internet,many new business models emerge,and the integration of traditional industries with the Internet also presents a new operation model.The development of Internet industry has brought about the two-sided platform,which is the trading intermediary.Two-sided platform economy emerged under this background.From the early UnionPay,telecommunication industry to the later marriage agencies,game operators and today's fast-growing business platforms are typical bilateral platforms.With the rapid development of Internet technology and people's awareness of making full use of resources.The new sharing platforms grown rapidly,such as online car appointment and short rent sharing,it also belongs to the category of two-sided platforms.Network externality is the most important feature of platform economy,and it is also the most distinctive feature distinguishing from the traditional economy.Due to the externality,the pricing on one side not only directly affects the number of users on this side,but also indirectly affects the number of users on the other side.Therefore,in the operation of two-sided platforms,pricing strategy is the most important decision-making problem of the platform.Market structure is the basis of economic operations.Under different market structures,platform pricing has different influencing factors.This paper takes the pricing strategy of two-sided platform as the main research line and studies the platform pricing problem under different market structures based on two-sided market theory.Under the monopoly market structure,the main factor affecting pricing strategy is the charging mode,which can be divided into three cases:charging transaction fees,registration fees and two-part charging.It is found that the three charging modes are all affected by network externalities.Under these charging modes,the registration fee is inversely proportional to the cross-network externalities and directly proportional to the self-competitive network externalities.And the pricing strategy is related to user size.The registration fee will decrease with the improvement of matching degree between buyer's credit and platform search.Under the market structure of homogenous two-sided platform competition,considering the two-stage dynamic pricing of the platform,the following three situations will occur in the market:both platforms adopt a unified pricing strategy,both platforms adopt differentiated pricing strategies,and one platform adopts a unified pricing strategy,another adopts a differentiated pricing strategy.The profit of the platform is affected by the strength of network externality and consumer satisfaction.In each case,there will be a critical value for the strength of network externality.When the strength of network externality is less than thecritical value,the profit of platform B is higher than that of platform A.When the network external strength is greater than the critical value,the profit of platform A is higher than platform B.The profit of platform A is proportional to the intensity of network externality.When the consumer satisfaction is low,the profit of platform A is the highest when the uniform pricing strategy is adopted,and the profit level of platform A is the lowest when the differential pricing strategy is adopted.When the consumer satisfaction is medium or higher,the conclusion is opposite;For platform B,the profit level is always inversely proportional to the strength of network externalities,and when consumer satisfaction is low,platform B has the highest profit level when both adopt a unified pricing strategy.The profit level of platform B is the lowest when the differentiation strategy is adopted.When the consumer satisfaction is medium or higher,the conclusion is opposite.Under the market structure of heterogeneous platforms competition,considering the influence of pricing order of large-scale and small-scale platforms on competition strategy,there will be three situations in the market:large-scale platforms pricing first,small-scale platforms pricing first and two platforms pricing simultaneously.It is found that in the competitive market,the price level is always the highest when choosing to price first.Moreover,the market competition is the most intense when small-scale platforms are first priced.It is moderate when they are priced at the same time.While the market competition is the most moderate when large-scale platforms are first priced.The social welfare level is the highest when platforms are priced at the same time.If the difference of self-competitive network externality intensity remains unchanged,the difference of cross-network externality intensity is large,the social welfare level of small-scale platforms priced first is higher than large-scale platforms priced first.On the contrary,the social welfare level of large-scale platforms priced first is higher than small-scale platforms priced first.Whether large-scale platform or small-scale platform,the profit level is always the highest when choosing to price first,while the profit level is the lowest when pricing at the same time.Moreover,the platform profit margin is the largest when small-scale platforms are first priced,it is moderate when pricing simultaneous,and it is the smallest when large-scale platforms are first priced.