Research On The Implementation Effect Of Equity Incentives In China's Listed Companies

BackgroundThe continuous development of modern enterprises has gradually separated the ownership and management rights of the company.Due to problems such as information asymmetry,there has been a “agent conflict” between the operators and the owners.Based on the perspective of “agent conflicts”,the company's operators are provided with certain The “equity incentives” for the residual claim are generated.Equity incentives originated in the United States in the 1950 s and have gradually developed into mature stages in developed countries.With the continuous development and growth of China's capital market,it is necessary to introduce equity incentives and improve corporate governance.China's first real estate company Vanke Group,which implemented equity incentives,launched the “Staff Share Plan Specification” in the 1990 s.At that time,China did not have relevant equity incentive regulations.With the promulgation of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans for Listed Companies by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006,it marks the beginning of the standardization of equity incentives in China.Since then,relevant equity incentive laws and regulations have been introduced one after another,and China's equity incentive law market has gradually improved.The number of enterprises that carry out equity incentives in China has been increasing year by year.Nowadays,it is in a period of rapid growth,and its incentive forms and objects are also in the process of continuous optimization.In this context,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the implementation effect of the listed company's equity incentive plan through case studies.The case study selected in this paper is the US group equity incentive plan.PurposeOne of the research purposes of this paper is to summarize and analyze the relevant factors affecting the equity incentives of listed companies in China by summarizing the relevant literatures on equity incentives and statistical analysis of the implementation of equity incentives for listed companies in China.At the same time,based on literature and theoretical analysis,this paper builds an evaluation system for the effect of equity incentives of listed companies.The second purpose of the research is to use the evaluation framework constructed in this paper to analyze and evaluate the implementation effect of the US group equity incentive plan,in order to draw conclusions from the perspective of case practice,and to provide reference for the practice of equity incentives of listed companies in China.Main context and viewThe main content of this article is divided into the following five parts:The first part is the introduction of this paper.It mainly expounds the research background and research significance,research ideas and contents,the research methods used in this paper,the research contributions and existing shortcomings.The first chapter is mainly to lay the foundation and framework for the later writing.The second part is the literature review part.Through combing and summarizing the research of predecessors,the literature on equity incentives is summarized into three parts: equity incentive and incentive motivation,equity incentive scheme impact factors,equity incentives and company performance.At the same time,this chapter also reviews related literature.The third part is the theoretical analysis part of this paper.Firstly,it analyzes the theoretical basis of equity incentives of listed companies in China,and then descriptive statistical analysis of the overall situation of equity incentives of listed companies in China in the second section.On this basis,in the third The subsection analyzes the influencing factors of the implementation effect of equity incentives of listed companies in China from four aspects: institutional background,corporate governance,company characteristics and equity incentive scheme elements.In the fourth subsection of this chapter,this paper proposes an evaluation framework for the implementation effect of equity incentives for listed companies in China.The fourth part is the core of this article,the case analysis part.This chapter first expounds the basic situation of the US group equity incentives--from the analysis of the motivation and influencing factors of the US group equity incentives,analyzes the internal and external driving factors of the US group equity incentive implementation;and then from the incentive targets,incentives,exercise conditions,etc.In this regard,the disassembly analysis of Midea Group's equity incentive plan was carried out;finally,the retention rate of the incentive object and the failure rate of performance appraisal were selected to measure the completion of the equity incentive of the US group.In the second section of this chapter,the event research method is used to empirically analyze the short-term effects of equity incentives.The third section analyzes the long-term effects of the group's equity incentives from the horizontal and vertical dimensions and conducts an overall evaluation of the incentive effects in the fourth quarter.The fifth part is the research conclusion and suggestion part of this paper.Based on the previous research and analysis,the first section of this chapter analyzes the case from the perspective of the overall characteristics,incentive scope and incentives of the US group incentive plan.In the second section,the research proposals are proposed from the internal and external perspectives of the company,and the future research directions are explained in the third section based on the shortcomings of this paper.Main ContributionsThe main contributions of this article are:1.This paper mainly studies the effect of equity incentive scheme,combined with principal-agent theory,human capital theory and incentive theory,and evaluates the enterprise equity incentive scheme from the perspective of incentive results.Supplementing and perfecting the theoretical system of evaluating the equity incentives of listed companies in China will help to solve the theoretical research on corporate agency conflicts based on incentive mechanisms.2.At present,the research on the incentive effect of equity incentives is mostly limited to the analysis of financial effects.This paper analyzes the incentive effect,combines long-term,short-term,financial and non-financial indicators,and evaluates the incentive effect by level.The shortcomings of traditional financial indicators on performance evaluation are too one-sided,which enriches China's research on the field of equity incentive effect case analysis,and plays a certain role in the construction of China's enterprise equity incentive effect evaluation system.3.Enriched the database of equity incentive case studies in China.At present,the main direction of China's equity incentive research focuses on empirical research,and there are few relevant case studies.The case study object selected by this paper has a systematic,diverse and hierarchical case-based incentive plan.Practical enterprises adopt a single type and a small number of incentive plans.For example,there are few enterprises that carry out comprehensive and systematic equity incentive construction,such as Midea Group.Therefore,it is of practical significance to conduct research on their incentive plans,and implement equity for listed companies in China.The incentive plan provides a sample of the lessons.