Research On Retailer-supplier Channel Relationship Under Different Channel Power Structures

The retailer-supplier channel relationship refers to the cooperation and competition between producers and retailers,between producers and producers,and between retailers and retailers.Under the background of China's current economic transformation and increasing emphasis on domestic demand to stimulate economic growth,the retail industry is increasingly becoming an important sector in the development of the national economy,playing a strategic role in the healthy development of the entire macro economy.The study of channel relationships between merchants and retailers is particularly important.With the transfer of channel power between channel members,from the traditional producer-led channel relationship to the rise of large-scale retailers,retailers have dominated the channel relationship in some industries,and now,with the rapid development of network e-commerce,they form competition with physical retailers.The retailer-supplier channel relationship is in the process of continuous evolution.Based on the perspective of vertical restraint,this paper studies the impact of two pricing contracts under different channel power structures on channel profit and consumer welfare.Through the derivation of the mathematical model and the analysis of industry experience,the following main conclusions are drawn:(1)In the producerled channel relationship model,compared with the linear pricing method,the strong producers can promote the total channel profit by using two pricing contracts.And the improvement of consumer welfare.(2)In the retailer-led channel relationship model,as the cross-price elasticity coefficient between two retailers increases,the retailer can ask for the channel fee at a lower bargaining power level,and the probability of channel fees will increase;the retailer's bargaining power does not affect the channel profit,but affects the profit distribution of the channel profit between the retailer and the producer.As the bargaining power of the retailer increases,the greater the share of profits that retailers receive in the channel,the smaller the share of profits that producers will receive.;compared with the channel relationship when the producer has full channel power,as the channel power is transferred to the retailer,the total channel profit and the retail price of the goods will increase.(3)In the model of the influence of ecommerce on channel relationship,as consumers increase their preference for a channel,the wholesale price,the retail price of the commodity and the profit of the retail channel in the two pricing contracts in the retail channel will increase,instead the wholesale price and fixed fee in the two pricing contracts between the competitor and the the retail price of goods and the profit of channel members will decrease.(4)As the network ecommerce channel is gradually recognized by consumers,the total channel profit is gradually reduced.When there is no difference in the preference of the channels,the total channel profit will be the lowest.Only when the consumer's preference for the network e-commerce channel selection exceeds the physical retailer,the total channel profit will gradually increase.(5)Compared with the physical retailer-led channel relationship model,the emergence of e-commerce has caused a decline in total channel profit and physical retail price.Finally,the paper summarizes the research conclusions of the full text,and puts forward some policy suggestions based on the existing problems in China's retailersupplier channel regulation,points out the inadequacies and future research directions of this paper.