The Effort Of Analyst Concern,Tax Evasion On Capital Budgetary Shirking

In management accounting,budget,as a widely used and classical means of management control,not only covers the operating functions of performance compensation and system evaluation,but also plays an important role in standardizing decision-making objectives and coordinating planning and organizing resources.However,with the deepening of social and economic environment and the concept of sustainable development,the actual problems of budget management become more and more complex,so the study of budget management has always been a hot topic.By sorting out the relevant budget literature,most empirical studies focus on financial and operational budgets,while the research on capital budget is still in the theoretical stage,especially on the discharging responsibility of capital budget.The essence of discharging responsibility of capital budget is the problem of capital investment caused by principal-agent cost and information asymmetry.Therefore,this paper takes the source of capital budget funds as the starting point,and deeply studies the mechanism of new financing methods(tax evasion)on the discharge of capital budget responsibilities.Analysts are concerned that as an information medium to protect market investors,it can effectively reduce the moral hazard of managers and curb the occurrence of corporate irregularities.It is an important external corporate governance mechanism.Therefore,it is also necessary to study whether analysts are concerned about the effective suppression of tax evasion on the impact of capital budget discharges.This paper chooses enterprises listed in A-share manufacturing industry from 2015 to 2017 as research samples,and takes China's industrial policy and tax system reform as research background,deeply analyses the impact of tax evasion on capital budget discharging,as well as the regulatory role of analysts' attention on the negative effect of tax avoidance.Firstly,this paper reviews the literatures on analysts' concerns,tax evasion and capital budget discharging with normative analysis method,and deduces two hypotheses based on financing constraints theory,principal-agent theory and tax evasion theory: the positive correlation between tax evasion and capital budget discharging;the external supervision effect that analysts pay attention to can restrain avoidance.Tax has a moderating effect on the negative impact of capital budget discharge.Then,we use statistical software to do routine empirical analysis of the collected data,and use the proxy variables of tax evasion and conditional elimination method to do robustness analysis of the research conclusions.In addition,in order to examine the impact of heterogeneity of property rights on the research results,this paper also makes further research.The results show that:(1)corporate tax avoidance significantly increases the risk of capital budget discharging;(2)analysts' concern can restrain the negative impact of tax avoidance on capital budget discharging,and has a regulatory effect;(3)compared with private enterprises,the agency cost of tax avoidance in state-owned enterprises is more significant,and the regulatory effect of analysts in state-owned enterprises is invalid.State.Finally,this study not only enriches the theoretical study of capital budget discharge,but also provides empirical evidence for how to improve the efficiency of capital execution and how to improve tax mechanism in China.