An Empirical Research On The Impact Of Internal Control And Executive Ownership On Corporate Performance

As China has entered the new normal of economy,the deepening of economic system reform is extremely urgent.To improve quality and improve efficiency has become a new ecology in China's economic construction.The proposal of "One Belt And One Road" provides a broader platform for Chinese enterprises to go abroad,and the accompanying risks and opportunities also test Chinese enterprises.Improving the performance of listed companies is the basis for China's continuous economic development and its march toward the world.As an enterprise risk control system,internal control provides an important institutional guarantee for the healthy and sustainable development of the company and promotes the improvement of enterprise performance.Since the promulgation of sarbanes-oxley act of the United States in 2002,all countries have been committed to improving their internal control systems to restrain the production and operation activities of domestic enterprises.As a means of encouraging senior executives,senior executives' shareholding makes their interests more consistent with those of the company and reduces speculation for personal gain with power,which is also indispensable for the improvement of corporate performance.This paper puts internal control,executive shareholding and enterprise performance into the same framework,and USES the method of empirical research to study the internal relations among internal control,executive shareholding and enterprise performance.Through the research of this paper,three conclusions are drawn: first,there is a positive correlation between internal control and enterprise performance,the higher the internal control,the better the enterprise performance;Second,there is a positive correlation between executive stock ownership and enterprise performance.Third,the internal control plays a regulating role in the process that the executive stock ownership affects the enterprise performance.The main innovation of this paper is to put internal control,executive stock ownership and enterprise performance into a framework for research,and verify the regulatory effect of internal control.The logical framework of this paper is divided into the following parts:The first part is the introduction and the literature review.By reading the previous research literature on internal control,executive stock ownership and enterpriseperformance,this paper provides the literature basis for the following theoretical analysis and empirical analysis.The second part is the theoretical analysis of internal control,executive stock ownership and enterprise performance.Based on principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,the relevant concepts of the three are defined,and the influence of internal control and executive stock ownership on enterprise performance is theoretically analyzed to explore the action path.The third part is the empirical part.Through the reading of previous literatures,the research model and indicators of this paper were constructed.STATA and SPSS statistical software were used to empirically analyze the collected data and verify the hypothesis of this paper.The fourth part is the conclusion and suggestion part.Based on the empirical results of this article conclusion,namely the internal control and enterprise performance is positive correlation,the executives shareholding positive correlation with corporate performance,internal control impact on executives shareholding enterprise performance adjustment effect,according to the research conclusion is put forward to perfect the internal control system,the Suggestions to carry on the reasonable equity incentive executives.