The Empirical Research On The Family Involvement And Enterprise Innovation Level

Family business,as the main body of China's private economy,has grown rapidly after the reform and opening up,and has brought about earth-shaking changes in all aspects of Chinese society.However,it is undeniable that it has exposed many problems in the process of development,such as insufficient innovation motivation,intergenerational inheritance problems,contradictions between closed governance models and open markets,among which the lack of innovation motivation is family business.One of the most urgent problems to be solved,so the research on the level of innovation of family business has begun to attract more and more scholars.Then through the combing of related literatures,most of the research on family business innovation is focused on enterprise scale,corporate culture,executive characteristics,environmental uncertainty,national policies,etc.Only a few studies will control the governance structure and innovation of family businesses.The levels are linked together,but the conclusions of the relevant research are also quite different.This may be related to the difference between the research sample,the discussion context,and the choice of indicators.So this article starts from here,the main effect of family involvement and enterprise innovation level.On the basis of introducing mediator variables and regulatory variables,I hope to further explore the influence of family governance on the internal innovation of family enterprises and open the "black box" between the two.This article takes China's A-share listed family business as the research object,and obtains 3445 sample data from 2012 to 2016 through the Guotaian database,enterprise annual report and prospectus.Firstly,the relationship between family involvement and enterprise innovation level is discussed.From the more common divisional dimension of family involvement,it is subdivided into ownership involvement and management rights,and the level of enterprise innovation is divided into Innovative input and innovative output,classification research on the impact of family ownership and management rights on the level of technological innovation of enterprises.Secondly,on the basis of combining relevant theories,we add the intermediary variable executive compensation,and introduce the nature of the regulatory variable industry to analyze the regulatory effect of the industry nature on the mediating effect.Data processing with Stata15.0 leads to the following conclusions:First,the deepening of family ownership involvement will lead to a decline in corporate innovation input and output;the deepening of family management involvement will lead to a decline in corporate innovation input and output.Second,the deepening of family ownership involvement will lead to a reduction in executive compensation;the deepening of family management rights will lead to a reduction in executive compensation.Third,executive compensation has a partial intermediary role in the relationship between family ownership and innovation level,and in the relationship between family management power and innovation level.Fourth,in the family business,the negative impact of ownership of high-tech enterprises on innovation investment and output of enterprises is weaker than that of non-high-tech industries;the management rights of high-tech enterprises are involved in innovation investment,The negative impact of output is weaker than that of non-high-tech industries.Finally,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of the enterprise itself and the regulatory authorities.For the family business,it can reduce the agency cost and improve the senior management by adjusting the senior management team structure,optimizing the salary incentive mechanism and creating the innovation culture atmosphere.The willingness and ability to make innovative investments fundamentally enhance the company's ability to innovate.For the regulatory authorities,it is necessary to further clarify and standardize the accounting treatment rules and disclosure systems for enterprise R&D investment,which not only helps to improve the short-sighted behavior of business managers,but also helps regulators to better perform their supervisory functions.